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Letter dated 16 July 2007 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and in accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 1698 (2006), I have the honour to submit herewith the report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

I would appreciate it if the present letter, together with its enclosure, were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Jorge **Voto-Bernales**
Chairman

07-38459 (E) 200707

Letter dated 13 June 2007 from the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004)

The members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo have the honour to transmit herewith the final report of the Group, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1698 (2006).

(*Signed*) Ibra Déguène **Ka**
Chairman

(*Signed*) Enrico **Carisch**

(*Signed*) Abdoulaye **Cissoko**

(*Signed*) David **Huxford**

Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1698 (2006)

[Original: English/French]

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I. Introduction

1. The Security Council, by its resolution 1493 (2003), imposed an arms embargo on the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular on the Ituri district and the two provinces of North and South Kivu. By its resolution 1596 (2005), the Council extended the embargo to the entire country, clarified the exemptions to the embargo, strengthened the monitoring mechanism and decided that all governments in the region, especially those of neighbouring States, should ensure that the measures set forth in the resolutions were implemented.

2. The mandate of the Group of Experts, reiterated by the Security Council in resolution 1698 (2006), encompasses investigations of the illicit transfer of embargoed materials, of assistance rendered in connection with such violations, including that related to cross-border movements, civil aviation and financial activities, of violations of international civil aviation standards, as well as of individuals who recruit or use children in violation of international law and leaders of armed groups who prevent their combatants from disarming.

3. The Council, by the same resolution, requested the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible with a view to extending the mandate of the Group of Experts for a period expiring on 31 July 2007 and requested the Group to provide regular updates on its work to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereafter referred to as the Committee). Interim reports were presented to the Committee by the Chairman of the Group in New York on 24 January 2007 (see S/2007/40) and on 2 May 2007. By paragraph 4 of resolution 1698 (2006), the Security Council also requested the Group to report to the Council in writing, through the Committee, by 10 July 2007.

4. By letters addressed to the President of the Security Council dated 7 August 2006 (S/2006/624) and 28 August 2006 (S/2006/693), the Secretary-General informed the Council of the reappointment of the members of the Group of Experts. Chaired by Ibra Déguène Ka (Senegal), the Group was composed of: Enrico Carisch (Switzerland, finance expert), Abdoulaye Cissoko (Mali, aviation expert), David Huxford (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, arms trafficking expert) and Jean Luc Gallet (France, customs and immigration expert).

5. By a letter dated 15 December 2006 (S/2006/984), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of the appointment of the current membership of the Group of Experts. Chaired by Ibra Déguène Ka (Senegal), the Group at present is composed of Enrico Carisch (Switzerland, finance expert), Abdoulaye Cissoko (Mali, aviation expert) and David Huxford (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, arms trafficking expert).

6. During its current mandate, the Group was assisted by two consultants, Alcinda Honwana (in November 2006) and Caty Clement (from May to July 2007), and by Manuel Bressan, Political Affairs Officer, United Nations Secretariat.

7. The Group of Experts wishes to express its thanks, in particular, to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, William Lacy Swing, and the staff of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) for their support and continued collaboration. The Group also expresses its thanks to the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) for the

facilities it offered the Group during its stay in Bujumbura and to the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) for the assistance it provided in southern Sudan.

II. Methodology

8. The Group of Experts had nine months at its disposal for field investigations before preparing its final report and three weeks for investigations following the submission of the draft final report.

9. Within the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Group met with governmental authorities and institutions and pursued its enquiries in the field. The Group has visited and analysed the security situation in many of the areas in which activities by illegal armed groups have been reported. It conducted as many missions to the Ituri district and Province Orientale, North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema as were possible within logistical and security constraints. In the west of the country, the Group investigated the situation in Kinshasa and Gbadolite.

10. Throughout its work, the Group concentrated on conducting investigations into areas in which armed groups were active, integrating all aspects of the relevant mandates in a coordinated manner. Thanks to the length of its mandate, the Group had the opportunity to conduct further missions in the field, with the assistance of MONUC.

11. In the immediate region, the Group met with authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya and southern Sudan.

12. At the international level, the Group met with representatives of the Governments of Belgium, France, Germany, South Africa, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

13. Notes verbales were sent in advance to the countries to be visited by the Group, together with a list of the information requested. A list of entities and organizations contacted by the Group is contained in annex I to the present report.

III. Context

14. The Group of Experts began its work on 22 August 2006. It held a preparatory meeting in Paris from 4 to 7 September 2006 and arrived in Kinshasa on 23 September 2006, the day after the issuance of the statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/2006/40), in which the Council deplored the violence that had erupted in Kinshasa during the period from 20 to 22 August 2006 and invited the Committee to examine the situation in that city, if appropriate, in the context of the arms embargo.

15. The Group's arrival coincided with the signing by representatives of the camps of the two candidates (Joseph Kabila and Jean Pierre Bemba) of an *acte d'engagement*, by which they undertook not to resort to the use of arms prior to or following the second round of the presidential election and the provincial elections scheduled for 29 October 2006. The two candidates also declared Kinshasa a weapon-free city.

16. The publication on 15 November 2006 of the provisional results of the second round of the presidential election confirmed the victory of President Kabila.

17. Following the discussion by the Committee on 24 January 2007 of the interim report (see S/2007/40), the Group of Experts resumed its investigations in the field, arriving in Kinshasa one day after violence had erupted in the province of Bas-Congo between the Congolese security services and the movement Bundu dia Kongo, resulting in many casualties.

18. On 5 February 2007, the list of the new Congolese Government, headed by Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga, was officially announced and, on 24 February 2007, its programme adopted by the National Assembly. With the new institutions now in place, the Group of Experts has within the authorities of Government interlocutors who are fully responsible for the implementation of the sanctions regime.

19. On 22 March 2007, disagreements concerning the size of the Détachement de protection présidentielle of former Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba erupted in armed confrontation in Kinshasa. The conflict resulted in many casualties, especially among civilians. The intervention of MONUC helped to avoid further casualties.

20. Across the whole country, insecurity created by the remaining domestic and foreign armed groups, the incomplete integration process, the misconduct of the armed forces, police and security services, the continued weakness of State authority in the eastern part of the country and, in particular, the presence of armed groups, some of which still operate in areas in which there is a dense concentration of natural resources, represent serious threats to physical and economic security.

21. The situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that the sanctions regime continues to address is characterized by continuing violence, insecurity, and instability in both the east and the capital. The road to peace in the country is punctuated by frequent incidents of deadly violence, as witnessed in Kinshasa in August and October 2006 and again in March 2007, Sake in November 2006, Bas-Congo in January 2007 and Kanyola in May 2007 — a list that is not exhaustive. Ongoing deficiencies and delays in the integration process of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) result in a lack of State authority to secure the territory. The combination of these elements threatens peace and security not only in the Democratic Republic of the Congo but in the region as a whole.

IV. Cooperation between Member States and the Group of Experts

22. The Group of Experts has made constant efforts to maintain an open dialogue and strengthen its cooperation with the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and with those of the neighbouring countries.

23. During the first part of the Group's mandate, cooperation with the Government was not at the level expected by the Group owing to the electoral period. A new focal point, charged with facilitating cooperation with the Group, was subsequently appointed. In spite of its established channels of communication with the

authorities, the Group notes that all sanctioned individuals and entities on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo continue their activities with impunity despite Security Council sanctions. The Government has yet to respond to the requests for updated information concerning the implementation of targeted sanctions. Requests transmitted to the Government concerning the security situation and arms flows in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remain unanswered.

24. In connection with paragraph 20 of Security Council resolution 1698 (2006), the Group has noted that cooperation with Uganda has improved consistently, notably the meeting that President Yoweri Museveni accorded the Chairman of the Group, the visit to the facilities of Luweri Industries in Nakasongola, Uganda, on 23 February 2007, and the appointment of a focal point in the person of the late Brigadier Noble Mayombo.

25. Requests for information regarding the transit of precious and semi-precious materials and stones from the Democratic Republic of the Congo have been addressed to Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and the United Republic of Tanzania. No information has been provided in response to those requests.

26. The Group has requested information on civil aviation from Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Moldova, São Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone and Ukraine. While Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Moldova and Sierra Leone have not conveyed any information to the Group, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, São Tome and Principe and Ukraine have provided partial responses. Ukraine has not yet provided the serial numbers and identities of the proprietors of certain Antonov airplanes, São Tome and Principe has not responded to the request for a visit by the Group, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo has yet to provide registration data on all airplanes currently operating within its territory.

27. The Group frequently contacts manufacturers and suppliers of arms and ammunition to request the information needed to identify the point of diversion of material from the licit to the illicit supply chain. Requests made include those for technical details and tracing information. Of the 17 requests transmitted by the Group during its current mandate, only the United States has responded.

28. The participation of the Congolese authorities in monitoring flows of embargoed material would be of much assistance to the Group of Experts. Requests for assistance concerning embargoed material captured by or transferred to FARDC, as well as access to FARDC personnel for interviews, have been conveyed to the Congolese authorities but there has been no response.

29. There are also outstanding requests for information addressed to the Governments of Angola and Belgium that date back to previous mandates of the Group. These include the absence of an official response to a request conveyed in a number of e-mails and following meetings held with the Belgian authorities from 22 to 24 May 2006 in connection with the attempted sale of pyrochlor by individuals based in and operating from Belgium. A request to the Government of Angola concerning a transfer of military material, cited in a previous report of the Group (see S/2006/525), also remains unanswered.

V. Cooperation between the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Group of Experts

30. The Group of Experts is grateful to MONUC for the support received during its current mandate. Nonetheless, the Group experienced some difficulties with respect to information-sharing as part of its collaboration with the Mission.

31. At the request of the Group, two focal points have been appointed within MONUC. The secretariat, in cooperation with the Group, has prepared a background paper which is being conveyed to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and MONUC, describing the mandate of the Group and its information needs vis-à-vis the Mission.

VI. Summary of investigations

32. The Group of Experts has focused on the main means of transferring arms in violation of the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council in resolutions 1493 (2003), 1596 (2005) and 1698 (2006). These include the smuggling, illicit internal circulation and stockpiling of embargoed material and the diversion of items from legitimate stocks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to illicit recipients. The Group has also paid attention to transfers of items made under the exemption to the arms embargo that have failed to meet the required reporting standards.

33. Although much has been done to monitor such transfers, the Group is aware that the arms embargo could be more effectively monitored if the Group were to receive assistance and input on a more regular basis from the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and if there were a more coordinated system of information-gathering and analysis concerning the embargoed material found in the country.

34. The Group of Experts was tasked to assist the Committee in the identification of individuals found to be violating international laws concerning children in armed conflict. During the course of its work, the Group has found the violation of these laws by armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to be endemic.

35. The Group has continued its investigations to identify political and military leaders who impede the disarmament and the voluntary repatriation or resettlement of combatants (resolution 1649 (2005), para. 2). Foreign armed groups operating in Ituri and the Kivus continue to violate this resolution.

36. Sanctions imposed by the Security Council in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are rarely enforced and thus have rarely had the intended coercive effect. Few sanctioned individuals and entities have demonstrably modified their activities as a consequence of the original listing of November 2005. As a result, investigative requests made by the Group are often ignored because sanctions are frequently perceived to be ineffective.

37. The Group can confirm that the most profitable financing source for armed groups remains the exploitation, trade and transportation of natural resources. The tightly intermingled economic interests of illegal armed groups with those of legitimate businesses and of local populations do not allow a clear demarcation to

be made between embargo violators and legitimate actors. All supply chains from areas controlled by armed groups are compromised.

38. With regard to civil aviation, the Group of Experts continued its investigations in order to identify the illicit transport of arms and ammunition and monitor airports and aircraft operation. The Group of Experts has drawn up a list of aircraft found in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and their status.

39. The Group recognizes that it is the responsibility of the elected and fully empowered Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to improve its weak control of embargoed materials, customs, immigration and civil aviation operations, and its oversight of natural resources and banking.

40. The authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo can no longer attribute lack of capacity to their inability to manage properly the needs of the country. There is an abundance of potential international assistance that includes advice and funding for technical and administrative improvements. It is for the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to request this assistance. The Government is now in a strategic position to choose between addressing the country's ills in an effective manner or allowing violence, corruption and the absence of rule of law to continue to hinder the country and the development of its population.

VII. Province Orientale and Ituri district

A. Armed groups

41. The Front des nationalistes et intégrationnistes (FNI), under the leadership of Peter Karim and his fellow officers, has consistently recruited and used children within its ranks. The majority of children identified are in their early teenage years. Peter Karim has now attained the rank of Colonel in FARDC along with a number of other FNI leaders and, to date, no action has been taken by FARDC against these officers for their violations of both domestic and international law.

42. Arms and ammunition stocks recovered from FNI show close similarities with embargoed items recovered from other Ituri armed groups. Two groups of items recovered from FNI are distinguishable for their type and age. Assistance has been requested from the manufacturers and suppliers of these embargoed items in order to trace the chain of ownership and the point of diversion.

43. There is a disparity between the number of former combatants, information gathered through interviews with former FNI combatants and the number of arms and amount of ammunition handed in during the disarmament processes. Some embargoed items previously under the control of FNI appear to remain outside the disarmament process.

44. The Group of Experts has also interviewed former combatants from the Front de résistance patriotique en Ituri (FRPI) and gained access to some recovered arms and ammunition. Under the leadership of "Cobra" Matata and his fellow officers, this group has continued to use children within its ranks.

45. At the time of writing, the apparent reluctance of FRPI to disarm fully seems to be linked to demands that its officers be assured of positions in FARDC similar to

those given to members of the Mouvement révolutionnaire congolais (MRC) and FNI.

46. The Group of Experts has interviewed former MRC combatants and gained access to arms and ammunition recovered from this group. Under the leadership of Matthieu Cui Ngudjolo and his fellow officers, the group has used children in violation of international law.

47. Attempts by the leadership of MRC to disassociate itself from the children within its ranks by expelling them prior to integration do not reduce the leaders' culpability. A number of the former MRC leaders now occupy officer positions in FARDC in accordance with arrêté ministériel MDNDAC/CAB/016/2006 of 2 October 2006.

48. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) re-entered the Democratic Republic of the Congo late in 2005 from southern Sudan and took up positions in the north-west of Garamba National Park. LRA positions remain in the Azande hunting domain in the west of the Park.

49. A number of meetings and interviews have been held with LRA delegations on Congolese soil. Although the total number of LRA forces on the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is unknown, the presence of the forces and their leaders is confirmed.

50. Unconfirmed reports have been received of LRA having been resupplied on the Congolese territory. Supplies of arms and related materiel or technical training and assistance, including financial assistance, to this foreign armed group would be in violation of the arms embargo.

B. The situation of civil aviation in Province Orientale of the Ituri district

51. On its arrival in Kisangani, Isiro and Bunia, the Group of Experts noted the presence of MONUC military observers at the airports and discovered that certain airlines were carrying freight and passengers in the same compartment in violation of Congolese regulations.

52. The Isiro airport — an airport where there are no customs authorities — is used by Air Navette for direct flights to Entebbe.

53. The Bunia airport, the entry and departure point for the Democratic Republic of the Congo designated in the memorandum of understanding between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is a veritable gateway to the goldmines of Mongwalu and Doko.

Recommendation

54. Flights by all airlines, whether national or international, that are found to be violating regulations must be suspended until the airlines comply with operating standards.

VIII. The Kivus

A. South Kivu and border with Maniema

1. Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda-Forces combattantes abacunguzi

55. As at 1 June 2007, the MONUC disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement or repatriation process has repatriated 5,230 Rwandan combatants and 4,947 of their dependants. The majority of the 10,177 repatriations have been individuals associated with the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda-Forces combattantes abacunguzi (FDLR-FOCA). MONUC estimates that only around 6,000 FDLR-FOCA combatants remain in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

56. Former combatants cite a continued policy within FDLR-FOCA of discouraging or prohibiting the MONUC process. Deserters frequently recount how they feared leaving because of retribution by their leadership if caught. FDLR-FOCA leaders repeatedly assert that all members who return to Rwanda are either killed or imprisoned. High-ranking members of the FDLR-FOCA leadership have repeated these false assertions to the Group of Experts.

57. Child combatants and children associated with FDLR-FOCA have been repatriated. Interviews conducted by the Group of Experts with both adult and former child combatants confirm the continued use of children, in violation of international law.

58. The Group has continued its investigations into the arms and ammunition recovered from FDLR. In spite of the repatriation of 10,177 Rwandans, the number of arms and amount of ammunition recovered from FDLR-FOCA is comparatively low. A comparison of information gathered from deserters concerning the armament of FDLR-FOCA, the levels of supply prior to the embargo, the numbers of weapons handed in during the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and resettlement or repatriation process and the current low level of ammunition expenditure by FDLR indicates the retention of significant amounts of stock acquired prior to the embargo.

59. Interviews with FDLR-FOCA members confirm a continued, low-level acquisition of ammunition from individual FARDC soldiers.

60. FDLR-FOCA has hierarchical political and military structures with common policies. The impediments put in place in respect of voluntary repatriation, the continued use of children as combatants and the illicit acquisition of ammunition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo makes the leadership of FDLR-FOCA possible targets for sanctions.

2. South Kivu field investigations

61. In the investigations reported in the present section of its report, the Group confirms that there are close linkages among the activities of the FDLR-FOCA 2nd Division, the exploitation of small-scale miners, and the civil aviation industry which connects the regions visited with Bukavu.

62. Banro Corporation, a Canadian junior mining company with exploration and exploitation permits for gold deposits in Namoya (Maniema province) and South Kivu province, has the largest holdings of potential gold deposits in the region. The company has stated that it does not at present mine or export any minerals. It has

also declared that, as a matter of company policy, it will not purchase any minerals from the small-scale miners or other persons who are active on its properties. Investigation by the Group of Experts confirms the accuracy of these assertions and, during visits to artisanal mining areas, the Group discovered that FARDC and the Police nationale congolaise provide security to the concession areas in which Banro is currently active.

63. Saramabila and Namoya are under the control of a non-integrated FARDC unit. FDLR-FOCA does not have a permanent presence in Namoya, yet its 3rd Battalion remains active in and around Kilembwe. Members of the Battalion extort their share of the local trade, including general merchandise, cassiterite and gold. Road access east of Kilembwe means that this area does not depend on the Namoya airstrip as its main means of access. Trade is directed towards Fizi, Baraka and Uvira.

64. Thanks to special arrangements with the local military leadership, Yuma Mukwala (also known as Haras) who consolidates the gold from the 40 traders in Namoya, is able to sell the entire output of this area in Bukavu.

65. The extent of local exploitation of cassiterite, wolfram and other semi-precious minerals, while not known, is sufficient to justify around six flights each week, with a cargo of 2,000 kg transported to Bukavu per rotation.

66. Route national 2 connects Kamituga with Bukavu but there is limited overland commerce owing to road conditions and security concerns. The Kamituga airstrip remains the main access for trade in this area.

67. The FARDC 122nd Infantry Brigade is in control of Kamituga and of the mining areas close to the population centres, and is deployed along the main road towards Mwenga and Kitutu. Away from these FARDC positions along the main roads and in outlying villages in the forests of Itombwe and Shabunda, the territory is controlled by elements of the FDLR-FOCA 4th Battalion, sometimes co-located with remnant Mai-Mai elements. This territory encompasses significant areas of small-scale natural resource exploitation and trading routes used by civilians to access population centres. There are consistent reports of FDLR-FOCA deployments in the areas around points of natural resource extraction, as well as of taxation and control structures on the smaller trading routes and FDLR-FOCA combatants trading in those resources.

68. The small-scale exploitation of substantial gold, cassiterite and coltan deposits in and around Kamituga supports a finely networked buying system that is operated by three companies which act as traders and airfreight forwarders: Atral, Delta Force and Zalia.

69. The Group has interviewed dozens of small buying agents for these three main companies who operate from small stalls along Route national 2, and has determined that the gold extracted each month in the Kamituga area amounts to several kilograms.

70. According to the proprietors of the airfreight companies, all gold is bought by either Etablissment Namukaya (Congocom) or Etablissment Panju. The Group is of the view that unknown quantities of gold are delivered to other Bukavu-based gold traders.

71. The Group has documented 22 tons of cassiterite flown from Kamituga to Bukavu during 2006. While this quantity is far too modest to reflect the actual total output of the area, the Group has no basis on which to provide an accurate estimate. The production justifies one to three aircraft rotations, four times a week, to Bukavu.

72. The FARDC 11th Integrated Brigade has its headquarters in Shabunda and a position in the village of Lulingu. Its 2nd Battalion is deployed in Shabunda territory, with a concentration north of Lulingu. Although FARDC controls the main population centres and is deployed along some roads and the main airstrips, FDLR-FOCA and remnant Mai-Mai groups are active outside the areas of FARDC influence. The areas under the control of armed groups include points of small-scale extraction of cassiterite and gold.

73. According to the authorities of both Shabunda and Lulingu, small-scale extraction of gold and cassiterite is the principal source of income for the local inhabitants and for the FDLR-FOCA units operating in the surrounding areas. The principal buyer of the gold from these two regions is Etablissement Namukaya. Some local traders allege that Etablissement Panju is still buying gold.

74. An estimated 636.3 tons of cassiterite and 682.05 tons of wolfram were transported from the area surrounding Shabunda and Lulingu area in 2006. The buyers of these products were the trading companies Mujeje, Olive, WMC, MDM, Sakima, Kitambala, Panju and others.

3. Increased air transport of commodities at the Bukavu/Kavumu airport

75. The Bukavu/Kavumu national airport is the hub of the major South Kivu airline network. The former Sominki runways located in the mining area (see annex II) are the terminal airports.

76. Traffic at the Bukavu/Kavumu national airport averages about 35 movements per day.

77. Although all the Government monitoring services are in place, this airport remains a veritable sieve; each of those services collects fees from the airlines, passengers and freight forwarders and closes its eyes to anything abnormal. These practices have also been observed at the arrival airports.

78. Airlines based in Bukavu (see annex III) carry ores for comptoirs that are located there and have correspondents in the mines for the purchase and direct extraction of those ores through freight forwarding agencies, the main ones being Delta Force, Atral and Zalia (for flights to Kamituga); Agefreco Air, Congocom Air and Stellavia (for flights to Namoya); and Agefreco Air, Congocom Air, Grace Express, Lokole and Acosha (for flights to Shabunda and Lulingu). Outbound flights carry various goods. Every return flight carries, on average, 2,000 kg of ore. In the most favourable conditions, 1,700 kg is the maximum tonnage that should be carried by this type of aircraft. The aircraft are thus stretched to the limits of their capacities.

79. Moreover, contrary to air transport regulations, which require a detailed description of the aircraft's cargo in the air waybill, the airline's cargo manifest merely gives the total tonnage of all the goods to be shipped.

80. It should also be noted that, most of the time, passengers are boarded in addition to freight in the same compartment, in violation of the regulations in force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

4. Gold traders based in Bukavu

81. Gold extracted from the South Kivu mining sites is consolidated in Bukavu by Etablissment Namukaya which in turn delivers its gold to Bujumbura. Guy Liongola, based in Tessenderlo, Belgium, imports the gold to Belgium on a regular basis. According to records that the Group was able to inspect, Mr. Liongola received 34,933 kg of gold between 11 August 2006 and 10 February 2007.

82. Zulfa Karim Panju is alleged to be a significant buyer and exporter of gold, despite the fact that, officially, he let his trading licence expire on 16 September 2006. The Group is not prepared to draw conclusions on Mr. Panju's status as a gold trader. On the one hand, there are still unresolved judicial proceedings against him dating back to 19 November 2002 when he was arrested in Belgium for suspected money-laundering. According to media reports Mr. Panju is accused of being part of a conspiracy involving Aziza Kulsum, also known as Mrs. Gulamali, who allegedly sold weapons to the Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie-Goma (RCD-GOMA).

83. On the other hand, Mr. Panju's past declarations of gold exports suggest a higher degree of transparency than the declarations made by his successor Namukaya. From April 2005 to February 2006, the Panju company declared gold exports of 549.95 kg, while Namukaya, during a comparable period one year later, only declared 109.11 kg. Because substantially higher world market prices for gold during the period from 2006 to 2007 would actually encourage higher export figures, officials of the South Kivu branch of the Division of Mines and the Centre d'évaluation, d'éxpertise et de certification consider that these discrepancies indicate significant smuggling.

B. North Kivu

1. Forces loyal to the former General of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

84. Since August 2006, the forces loyal to former FARDC General Laurent Nkundabatware (Nkunda) have comprised the non-integrated 81st and 83rd brigades of FARDC, the military wing of the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP), loyalist elements of FARDC mixed brigades, and a number of smaller alliances of disaffected combatants in North Kivu, including remnant Mai-Mai elements.

85. In November 2006 MONUC peacekeeping forces intervened militarily in Sake (North Kivu province), when combatants loyal to rebel General Nkunda clashed with FARDC integrated brigades. Following these clashes, negotiations were conducted between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the rebel forces. It was agreed that combatants loyal to Nkunda would not immediately go through the system of brassage, set up for the process of integrating FARDC and through which all other integrated brigades in the Democratic Republic

of the Congo had passed. A process of mixage was initiated whereby other non-integrated units were brought into North Kivu and mixed with rebel units.

86. In January 2007, the process of mixage began and five FARDC mixed brigades were created. In only one mixed brigade have soldiers been mixed below the battalion level. In the other brigades, the individual battalions co-exist within the new brigades and retain the internal structures that they had prior to the process. Following this process, the mixed brigades have remained in North Kivu.

87. The CNDP politico-military organization, under the chairmanship of Nkunda, has a military wing containing a number of disaffected military officers, including individuals already subject to Security Council sanctions. One of them, Bosco Taganda, holds the position of CNDP commander of operations. Mr. Taganda does not hold an official position in FARDC but is involved in the planning and direction of FARDC mixed brigade operations.

88. At the time of writing, the FARDC 8th Military Region has weak command and control over Nkunda loyalist elements in the mixed brigades. Nkunda and CNDP retain a certain level of command and control of these loyalist units, as well as of other unmixed, non-integrated forces in North Kivu.

89. In the past 10 months, there has been extensive recruitment of combatants into the ranks of forces loyal to Nkunda.

90. Within the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congolese adults and children have been both voluntarily and forcibly recruited. Networks sympathetic to Nkunda and with ties to CNDP have also recruited individuals in both Rwanda and Burundi. Among the new recruits are Burundian and Rwandan civilians, demobilized combatants and Congolese citizens, some of whom were recruited from Congolese refugee camps in Rwanda. Some of those recruits have been children.

91. Transport for new recruits from outside the Democratic Republic of the Congo was provided and paid for by the recruitment networks. Some recruits claim to have openly crossed the official border posts and others have crossed on foot in groups away from official checkpoints and into military camps in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In those camps, military training, arms, ammunition and, occasionally, uniforms and salaries were provided.

92. A number of cases have been recorded of recruits with military training being brought to the Democratic Republic of the Congo to instruct forces loyal to Nkunda.

93. Forces loyal to Nkunda have recruited and used children, in violation of international law. In spite of an order given by FARDC that all children were to be demobilized, there are numerous cases of this order having been disobeyed by Nkunda loyalist forces within the mixed brigades.

94. Children have deserted or been demobilized from each of the mixed brigades. Some children have been threatened and attacked by officers of these units to prevent them from leaving, or have been physically removed from the care of child protection agencies. Children who remain in the FARDC mixed brigades have been deployed with their units, some of which have been subsequently involved in active combat against FDLR in North Kivu.

95. Deserters from Nkunda loyalist forces recount how they have received on an irregular basis cash payments ranging from US$ 5 to US$ 25. Even while in

rebellion against the chain of command of the 8th Military Region, the 81st and 83rd brigades continued to receive money for salaries from FARDC. The collection of taxes by forces loyal to Nkunda has been widely reported. Some logistical supply has been provided to the mixed brigades by the 8th Military Region, and sources within the brigades claim that this has included ammunition for operations against FDLR-FOCA.

96. Interviews with deserters from forces loyal to Nkunda have yet again illustrated the ease of access to illicit stocks of ammunition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Access to arms caches in both North and South Kivu have contributed to the logistical supply of these forces. The use of porters, including children, to recover and move ammunition stocks from within the Kivus for the benefit of Nkunda's forces has been recorded.

97. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has been requested to assist the Group of Experts in its investigations into the stocks of military material in North Kivu that remain outside the control of FARDC. Information has also been requested regarding stocks of recovered armaments, weaponry held by the mixed brigades and heavy weaponry handed in by armed groups. The Government has yet to respond.

98. Considering the limited command and control by the 8th Military Region of forces loyal to Nkunda, it is difficult to see how supplying these forces with arms and related materiel or technical training, including financial assistance, can be done within the terms of the Security Council arms embargo in its current form.

2. Mai-Mai and Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda-Forces combattantes abacunguzi

99. Mai-Mai groups continue their armed activities in the northern part of North Kivu, known as the Grand Nord, and are sometimes co-located with units of foreign armed groups. Their use of children in violation of international law is endemic.

100. Members of interviewed FDLR-FOCA splinter groups claim to be part of National Army-Imboneza, the armed wing of the Ralliement pour l'unité et la démocratie (RUD)-Urunana presided over by Jean Marie Higiro, a resident of the United States. The political leaders of RUD-Urunana stated that they had no information on armed group leaders in the Democratic Republic of the Congo who claimed to be part of RUD-Urunana.

101. Mai-Mai, FDLR-FOCA and FDLR-FOCA splinter groups operate in artisan mining areas in the north of North Kivu and control some transportation routes to trading centres.

3. Allied Democratic Forces and National Army for the Liberation of Uganda

102. In December 2005, joint FARDC-MONUC operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo led to the destruction of many camps and the scattering of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU). Between May and July 2006, ADF/NALU recovered some of its former positions within Congolese territory.

103. Clashes between FARDC and ADF/NALU in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have become more numerous. ADF/NALU cross-border movements have

resulted in clashes between their forces and the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) in Uganda.

104. In March 2007, UPDF units in the Bundibugyo district of Uganda killed and captured a number of ADF/NALU combatants crossing from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group of Experts obtained access to some of the ammunition captured in that attack.

105. Throughout the current mandate of the Group, cases of child recruitment and re-recruitment in violation of international law have been confirmed.

4. Non-integrated units of the 85th Brigade of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo: update

106. Following up on the case study on cassiterite (tin oxide) production in Walikale presented in the Group's interim report (see S/2007/40, annex, sect. II.A) the presence, nature of abuse and illegal exploitation by members of the non-integrated FARDC 85th Brigade have not substantially changed. A small number of soldiers under the direct command of the 8th Military Region and the mining police who were recently deployed in the Walikale area were not able to break the 85th Brigade's control of the mining sites and the transit routes to and from the mining areas. Extortion and illegal taxation of producers and transporters have become even more profitable to the members of this armed group because of the increase in the world market price of tin oxides (cassiterite), accelerating the demand for transport, local trade and frequency of flights to and from Walikale.

107. Evidence that the control of the 85th Brigade of this mining economy remains profitable became apparent with a contract signed on 28 August 2006 with Dieudonne Tshishiku Mutoka, Administrator of the Walikale territory. The Administrator commits to supporting and ensuring the security of Groupe Minier Bangandula (GMB), a company that is competing for the cassiterite deposits in the area. In exchange for the security services provided by the Administrator, the company guaranteed Mr. Mutoka 10 per cent of the weekly production of the Bisie mine, US$ 0.05 per kilogram of all cassiterite extracted by the company at Bisie and 50 per cent of the receipts generated at the intermediary cassiterite selling stations at Njingala, Isanga and Maynano. The only possible provider of security in the area which is allied with the Administrator is the 85th Brigade and its leader, Colonel Sammy.

108. An additional mechanism that GMB can use to undermine the legitimate concessionaire is the Cooperative minière de Mpama Bisiye (Comimpa), whose membership is supposed to comprise local artisan miners. However, a review of the 22 names listed as founders of Comimpa reveals that 11 are also shareholders of GMB. The dominance of GMB is further revealed given that 10 GMB shareholders signed the statutes of Comimpa compared to only 5 non-shareholders.

109. The principal issue for the Group of Experts is that GMB and, by association, Comimpa, are financially enabling the potentially sanctionable activities of the 85th Brigade and its Colonel Sammy through its protection arrangement with Mr. Mutoka. The responsibility lies with the shareholders of GMB, who registered the company in Goma on 23 September 2005. Fifty per cent of the shares are owned by Saphir Society, with the remainder distributed among minority shareholders. Alexis Makabuza Rusenga, who represents the Society, is the General Manager and

main beneficiary of GMB. Mr. Makabuza was also one of the original signers of the Comimpa statutes.

5. Violations of civil aviation operating standards at the North Kivu airports

110. The Walikale runway, a segment of the national route built at the time of the rebellion by RCD-Goma, although it does not meet approved safety standards, is used for short take-offs and landings by aircraft such as the LET410UVP, the AN-28, AN-32 or AN-2, and even the C208 Caravan. There are 10 to 20 movements per day, depending on the season. In view of the accidents that have occurred here in the past three months, especially since the resumption of flights on the Walikale-Goma route, a request to close down the runway has been submitted to the relevant Ministry.

Photograph 1: Section of the road used as an airstrip in Mobi, Walikale



111. The Goma airport, with an average of nearly 40 movements per day, has become the leading airport in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo from the standpoint of air traffic. Registered traffic at Goma includes nearly 40 aircraft of all types (Twin Otter DHC-6, Cessna Caravan, AN-12, LET410, AN-24, AN-32, DHC-8, CASA 212, Partenavia 68 CTC).

112. Airlines based at that airport (see annex III) are chartered by comptoirs located in Goma, mainly for the transport of ores (cassiterite, coltan, wolfram, etc.).

113. The Goma airline network has practically the same terminal airports as Bukavu. In addition, Walikale is its main destination. The same holds true for Bukavu.

114. Airlines based in Beni (see annex III) are mainly present in the mining areas of the Ituri district and the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu.

115. The Ben airstrip is often used for non-stop international flights to and from Entebbe, as there are no Customs authorities there. Sanctions should be imposed on the chief culprits in this type of fraud — KFTC and COZA Airways.

116. The same goes for the Butembo airstrip, which was home to Butembo Airlines; however, this airline has ceased to operate for lack of aircraft. When it was still operating it had provided a weekly air bridge between Butembo and Mongwalu, the gold mining zone, and also non-stop service to Mwana (United Republic of Tanzania) while Butembo was a non-Customs airport.

6. Consequences of compromised gold and cassiterite supply chains

117. Based on the investigations described in paragraphs 61 to 74 above, the Group has established that the supply chains of all major precious and semi-precious minerals originating from North and South Kivu are compromised by diversions that benefit armed groups.

118. In 2006, total cassiterite exports by the 17 North Kivu-based traders with export licences (comptoirs) amounted to approximately 2,904 tons, the semi-refined export quantity of the approximately 5,306 tons of tin oxide delivered to Goma. Collected from hundreds of small-scale excavation sites in the following provinces, the quantity of cassiterite sent to Goma is as follows:

Province	*Tons*
Katanga	186.4
Maniema	722.5
North Kivu and South Kivu	4 255.6
Orientale	142.1

119. Comptoirs based in Goma require their suppliers to indicate the origin of the cassiterite. In fact, the locations indicated are in most cases merely an approximation of its true origin. Suppliers do not know the precise origin and do not have a full understanding of a supply chain that begins with small-scale mining operations and continues through several stages before the bags of cassiterite arrive at the airport of Goma.

120. Even if buyers were to know the precise location of all cassiterite mining sites, there is no sure way of ascertaining whether the sites and access to them are controlled by armed groups.

121. Consequently, buyers in end-user markets do not practice credible due diligence in the Kivus, Maniema, Katanga and Province Orientale that entitles them to claim that they are not buying from compromised sources.

122. Shown below is the total cassiterite bought or brokered in 2006 by entities based in six countries:

Country	*Tons*
Belgium	2 296
Hong Kong (China)	10.2
Kazakhstan	27.4
Malaysia	73.8
Rwanda	429
United Kingdom	67.5

123. On 28 December 2005, the Division of Mines of South Kivu, through the diplomatic representation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, informed the authorities of Burundi of individuals who were trading and smuggling natural resources in conjunction with arms traders. The list covers persons of both Congolese and Burundian origin and includes Mzee Mazee and Rama Mwite, the two most important buyers of gold in Uvira (see annex IV).

124. With the exception of the exports to Belgium by Mr. Liongola, all supply chains of gold from South Kivu pass through Bukavu and Uvira and end up with the Bujumbura representative of the Kampala gold trading firm of Machanga Ltd. This firm has a virtual monopoly over the approximately 0.5 to 1 ton of Burundian gold that is mixed with about 2 tons of gold, mostly illegally imported, from South Kivu. Until Machanga Ltd. was blocked with targeted financial sanctions, it sold all of this gold to Emirates Gold in Dubai.

125. During a visit to the gold refineries in Dubai in June 2005, the Group discussed industry standards of due diligence procedures that would be applied to gold consignments originating from Central African countries. Representatives of Emirates Gold assured the Group that proper checks were always carried out with sellers of raw gold, particularly if such materials might originate from countries in which armed groups operate.

126. Emirates Gold has provided the Group with documentation showing that, since 2005, it has purchased 10.17 tons of gold from the Kampala and Bujumbura offices of Machanga Ltd., 6.61 tons from UCI, 1.39 tons from A. P. Bhimji Ltd. and 0.03 tons from Congomet, companies that are known to trade in gold originating from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The total gold intake from Machanga Ltd. and UCI amounts therefore to 16.78 tons.

127. Emirates Gold no longer accepts gold from UCI and Machanga Ltd. and has blocked their accounts on the instructions of the authorities of the United Arab Emirates.

Recommendation: certification of natural resources by the Centre d'évaluation, d'expertise et de certification

128. New investigations by the Group into the widespread diversion of natural resources in the Democratic Republic of the Congo have reconfirmed the need for enhanced controls of natural resources. The urgency of this need was also recognized by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo when

the Minister of Mines signed arrêté ministériel No. 2503, dated 5 February 2007. This decree mandates the Centre d'évaluation, d'expertise et de certification to proceed with the development of a certification system for precious and semi-precious minerals and stones, as well as other mineral substances produced by small-scale miners. The Group of Experts recommends that the international community lend its technical, administrative and financial support to this project.

IX. Other investigations

A. Luwero Industries (Nakasangola, Uganda)

129. The visit of the Group of Experts to the ammunition production lines of Luwero Industries in Nakasongola, Uganda, on 23 February 2007 has greatly advanced the work of the Group.

130. Information provided on the date of manufacture, evolution of the manufacturing processes and post-production treatment and marking of the product are necessary elements in advancing the investigations of the Group into the supply of unmarked ammunition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the ammunition found in the hands of armed groups.

131. The Group of Experts considers this to be a good example of how technical cooperation among the manufacturer, the supplier and the monitoring mechanism can advance investigations into violations of an embargo.

B. Non-integrated units of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Détachement de protection présidentielle and Republican Guard

132. Following the violence in Kinshasa from 22 to 25 March 2007, the Group of Experts interviewed personnel and leaders of the Détachement de protection présidentielle who had surrendered, and examined recovered arms and ammunition. Some anomalies in the data are yet to be explained to the satisfaction of the Group. Tracing requests have been initiated and the response of manufacturing States and the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is necessary for the Group to reconcile the data.

133. The Group of Experts has observed Republican Guard units across the Democratic Republic of the Congo. During its current mandate, the units have prevented the free movement of United Nations staff, including the Group of Experts. The units are involved in activities as diverse as controlling access to airports and borders in the Kivus, and participating in the above-mentioned violence in Kinshasa.

134. Support given to these units, which are not under the control of the Etat-major integré or of the Police nationale congolaise, or fully integrated, raises the question of whether they can be considered to be in compliance with paragraph 2 (a) of Security Council resolution 1596 (2005).

C. Hussar Limited

135. The Group has learned that, in connection with the findings contained in paragraphs 78 to 80 of its report of July 2005 (see S/2005/436), Hussar Limited's long established relationship with a particular gold refinery had come to an abrupt end in the summer of 2004. Reportedly, all customers of the refinery were informed about changes to disclosure laws, including the introduction of the much more intrusive due diligence procedures under which raw gold was to be accepted for refining. One of the new disclosure requirements was the identification of the origin of raw gold. Rather than providing this information, Hussar Limited chose to switch to another refinery.

136. The Group has also recently learned that, subsequent to the publication of the above-mentioned report, Hussar Limited accused its supplier, the Kampala-based UCI, of not having disclosed the true origin of its gold. As a consequence, Hussar Limited proceeded to block payment of an outstanding balance of over US$ 700,000 owed to UCI. Hussar Limited has confirmed to the Group that since September 2005, long before UCI was placed on the list of individuals and entities subject to targeted financial sanctions and a travel ban, Hussar has retained US$ 780,057.52 that would have been due UCI and that this has now become subject to paragraphs 13 and 15 of resolution 1596 (2005).

D. Success of targeted sanctions against gold traders

137. The updated list of individuals and entities subject to targeted financial sanctions released on 29 March 2007 together with the announcement of a travel ban, which encompassed the major gold buyers in the region (UCI, Machanga Ltd., and Kambale Kisoni), has halted most gold-buying activities in Ituri and North Kivu. No alternative buyers have yet emerged and, as a result of the trading interruptions, gold was offered for sale on the local markets at a discount of as much as 15 to 20 per cent.

138. Two of those sanctioned, Mr. Kisoni and UCI, have already initiated consultations with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to determine how they could become a positive force in the gold exports of the country and possibly obtain a legal export licence.

E. Lack of enforcement of targeted sanctions (assets freeze and travel ban)

139. The Group of Experts is not aware of enforcement actions taken by Member States in connection with the list of individuals and entities established pursuant to paragraphs 13 and 15 of resolution 1596 (2005).

140. The Group has learned informally that the Government of the United Arab Emirates has advised Emirates Gold to block the accounts of UCI and Machanga Ltd.

F. Suspected violations of the arms embargo in civil aviation

141. A suspected violation of the arms embargo was behind the cases the Group of Experts investigated at the beginning of its mandate, including:

(a) The intentional diversion to Entebbe of a Service Air Antonov 12 ER-AXI aircraft which, at the time, was providing service between Goma and Kinshasa;

(b) The refusal by the Congolese military to inspect the cargo of a Ugandan Showa Trade aircraft arriving in Kinshasa from Entebbe on 23 September 2006.

142. However, since all the clues had vanished, all that could be proved by looking into these cases was the intentional diversion of the Service Air aircraft, for which the airline must be held accountable, and the observation, yet again, that the Congolese army was obstructing the proper monitoring of the Showa Trade flight by MONUC.

G. Monitoring of the operation of aircraft in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

1. Aircraft that no longer meet the airworthiness criteria continue to operate in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

143. On the basis of its investigations, the Group of Experts was able to establish that:

(a) The aircraft in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are largely obsolete leased aircraft;

(b) Aircraft continue to operate in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in defiance of international standards and national regulations. Others use fake registration numbers.

2. Aircraft leasing companies

144. The Group identified three aircraft leasing companies in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Doren Air Congo, Aerolift and Midlands Logistics.

145. Doren Air Congo leases aircraft and air transport services on request for cargo flights. Its fleet is composed mainly of LET aircraft. None of the Doren Air Congo LET410s or those that the Group of Experts identified in the Democratic Republic of the Congo meets the Joint Aviation Requirements (JAR) or Federal Administration Requirements (FAR) (see annex III).

146. There are no approved LET maintenance centres in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The BenAir approved maintenance centre established in Mombasa (Kenya) and certified, inter alia, to maintain LET aircraft, says that, during the year, it only worked on a Swala Aviation Congo aircraft and terminated the maintenance contract it had with Doren Africa when the airline became Doren Air Congo.

147. Nor have the airlines that operate LET aircraft managed to furnish evidence that their aircraft are periodically serviced at a certified centre.

148. Aerolift, an aircraft leasing company based in South Africa, was renting and operating LET and Antonov aircraft in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Following a number of accidents involving those aircraft and the shutdown of the airlines operating them, the company ceased to carry on business in this country.

149. The Midlands Logistics aircraft found in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, generally Antonovs, are rented to Galaxy, Mango Mat and TRACEP Aviation Congo. With regard to accidents involving some of these aircraft that have already occurred (see annex III), Midlands appears to be a broker that brought old Antonovs into the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

3. Antonov aircraft

150. The Group counted eight Antonov aircraft registered for the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the Antonov Design Bureau's list of its aircraft that no longer meet airworthiness criteria, designed to help civil aviation authorities ground them for retrofitting.

151. In the course of its investigations, the Group of Experts was able to establish that aircraft continue to operate in the African Great Lakes region in defiance of international standards (see S/2007/40, annex, para. 68).

152. Air Navette, long cited for illicit transport of arms and especially for assistance to armed groups, is one of them. It is registered under No. AN-12 3C-AAG in Equatorial Guinea, which is no longer in compliance with international operating standards.

153. Equatorial Guinea has not yet replied to the Group's request for authorization to visit that country to verify whether the Equatorial Guinea registration numbers found in the Great Lakes region, including AN-12 3C-AAG, are valid. Equatorial Guinea has not yet replied to this request.

154. Air Navette has just leased another AN-12 registered in Burundi under the number 9U-BHS in place of the AN-12 3C-AAG immobilized in Entebbe.

155. Burundian cooperation requested by the Group of Experts in order to find out the status of this aircraft has not been forthcoming either.

156. Aigle Aviation and Blue Airlines, by using both AN-28 registered 9XR-KI and 9XR-KV, respectively, are violating the provisions of paragraph 6 of resolution 1596 (2005).

Recommendations

157. Accordingly, all aircraft found to be in violation of paragraph 6 of resolution 1596 (2005) must be grounded and the airlines operating them should have their licences revoked.

158. **The Group also wishes to propose:**

(a) Tighter supervision of aircraft security by requiring airlines to comply with the conditions for importing and servicing aircraft on penalty of having their aircraft grounded;

(b) The establishment of an aircraft servicing shop in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to deal with the existing fleet. The idea would be to reduce operating expenses and the time the aircraft are immobilized, and to

ensure compliance with the necessary servicing programmes for maintaining the airworthiness of these aircraft;

(c) The restructuring of government civil aviation services with a view to providing much greater incentives to agents;

(d) The organization of a round table comprising government and private-sector aviation professionals, financial organizations and economic operators. The round table would be aimed at restructuring the air transport market and even downsizing airlines and their fleets.

4. Aircraft accidents continue to cast a pall over the Democratic Republic of the Congo

159. A number of aircraft accidents have occurred in the Democratic Republic of the Congo since the last mandate of the Group of Experts.

160. Three accidents caused by inadequate air control in the Democratic Republic of the Congo occurred in Walikale on 9 September 2006, 14 February 2007 and 17 May 2007.

161. On 9 November 2006, the LET410 registered under number 9Q-CBQ operated by Goma Express, carrying 2,000 kg of cassiterite (tin oxide) failed after technical difficulties; its emergency landing in Walikale destroyed houses and vehicles, killing one person and injuring others. There were two pilots and a passenger on board.

Photograph 2: Accident of LET410, operated by Goma Express and owned by Doren Air Congo (Walikale, 9 November 2006)

162. This accident is a clear example of non-compliance with runway maintenance standards, the overweight limit on the aircraft which, in the best of conditions, can safely carry only 1,700 kg, and non-compliance with Civil Aviation Authority Circular No. 416/DAC/TC/SEC/370/2003 of 2 May 2003 prohibiting the transport of passengers and freight in the same compartment.

163. On 14 February 2007, a Kenyan aircraft — a Cessna 208 Caravan registered under No. 5Y-BNN — was caught in bad weather as it was approaching Walikale and disappeared in the forest, never to be found again to this day. Poor judgement concerning weather conditions seems to be at the bottom of this tragedy.

164. Lastly, on 17 May 2007, again in Walikale, the LET410 registered under No. TH-AHE operated by Safe Air Company crashed at take-off after the right-side engine burst into flames and its speed dropped, killing two pilots and the passenger on board. An investigation under way has revealed technical shortcomings due to poor reconditioning of the aircraft before use.

165. As we see, in all three cases, air transport operating standards were disregarded.

166. Moreover, the Group of Experts examined the licences of the pilots and none of them was valid. Indeed, periodic inspections by flight personnel were not carried out properly. None of them mentioned type rating, which means that pilots could take advantage of this gap to go from one aircraft to another as the opportunity arose.

Recommendation

167. **Convinced that no helpful solution could be reached with the officials currently in place, the Group of Experts suggests launching a technical assistance project to provide advanced on-the-job training in the supervision of aviation security in order to lift the Democratic Republic of the Congo out of this illegal situation. The International Civil Aviation Organization usually conducts these projects.**

H. Confusion in regard to due diligence obligations

168. During its research into small-scale, semi-industrial and industrial mining, as well as local, regional and international trading operations, the Group of Experts has encountered considerable confusion among its interlocutors about what are considered legal, illegal or sanctionable activities.

169. These uncertainties have been created in part by confusion between the mandate of the Group and that of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. There is a perception among some stakeholders that the companies and individuals listed in annexes to the final report of the Panel of Experts (see S/2002/1146) were sanctioned. There are also significant discrepancies among States and their application of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. All of these factors result in confusing guidance on the conduct of business in regions with weak governance.

170. One of the risks resulting from these uncertainties is that banks might close the accounts of companies as a precautionary measure even if there were no clear evidence implicating those companies in sanctions violations.

171. Such risks have led one junior mining company to refuse all business relationships with artisan communities and an international refining company to

refuse any materials originating from small-scale mining communities in other African countries, even if the country is not a neighbour of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

172. In contrast to these over-conscientious compliance efforts, a number of leading European trading companies have simply declined to provide the Group with any information on their business operations, the origin of the natural resources that they are trading and the identity of their suppliers and stockholders. Essentially, the Group is asked to simply believe, sometimes against all evidence, that the due diligence efforts of these companies prevent possibly sanctionable transactions.

Recommendation: improved due diligence procedures

173. **As noted in paragraphs 61 to 74 and 168 to 172 above, widely compromised supply chains and the lack of adequate due diligence systems undermine the measures authorized by the Security Council to prevent financial assistance to illegally armed groups. The Group recommends that, in future, companies which cannot demonstrate adequate due diligence practices be sanctioned. The definition of what would be considered adequate due diligence practices would have to be elaborated.**

I. Transfers of embargoed material

174. The three main areas of transfers of weapons in violation of the arms embargo and which are of concern to the Group of Experts are: (a) the smuggling of embargoed material from outside the Democratic Republic of the Congo to unauthorized recipients within the country; (b) the illicit internal circulation and stockpiles of arms and ammunition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and (c) the diversion of embargoed material from legitimate stocks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to illicit recipients.

175. The risk of embargoed material being smuggled into the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains high. This is due to the demand for this material in the ongoing activities of both domestic and foreign armed groups and is facilitated by conditions which allow both large and small-scale smuggling with a relatively low risk of detection.

176. The internal circulation of embargoed material in the Democratic Republic of the Congo remains a significant source of illicit resupply to armed groups. Although much has been done to bring stocks of weapons under FARDC or United Nations control, innumerable illicit caches of embargoed items remain. MONUC continues to uncover hidden arms caches of this nature.

177. The diversion of embargoed material from legally held security force stocks to the illicit market in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is of concern to the Group. The sale of arms and ammunition by individual FARDC soldiers to supplement their income, poor stockpile control combined with endemic corruption within the security services, acquisition of embargoed material on the battlefield and transfers to armed groups by sympathetic individuals are all means of supply confirmed by members of armed groups during the Group's current mandate.

178. Based upon its work in small arms tracing initiated during the mandates authorized by the Council in resolutions 1616 (2005) and 1654 (2006), the Group of

Experts has expanded its activities to address the many types of embargoed material encountered in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Most large stocks of both illicit and licit arms and ammunition encountered in the Democratic Republic of the Congo by the Group are either of pre-embargo provenance or their point of diversion has proved to be untraceable. Circulation and recirculation of these stocks has further blurred the chain of ownership.

179. The task of identifying the component of post-embargo arms deliveries within the high levels of pre-embargo supplies found in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a major challenge to the monitoring bodies of the sanctions regime.

180. The Group does not have the capacity to be present each time embargoed material is encountered in the Democratic Republic of the Congo either through seizure, disarmament programmes, or during attacks. The MONUC arms embargo training session and the MONUC reporting system have done much to address autonomous information collection on this subject. There is a need for more detail in the collection of these data.

181. The monitoring mechanism does not at present have the means to effectively store and analyse these data. There is a need for a centralized database specific to the arms embargo imposed on the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the purposes of monitoring and analysing information on the embargoed material collected from armed groups, post-attack data, information on armed group weapon stocks transferred to FARDC, and deliveries made under the exemptions to the arms embargo.

182. Access to technical data specific to the embargoed material found in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has proved to be fundamental to the success of the investigations carried out by the Group of Experts. This has included access to commercial technical databases on arms and ammunition and technical information requested directly from manufacturing or supplying countries.

183. The Group has conducted initial trials on elements of an embargoed material information system tailored to the unique needs inherent in monitoring the arms embargo imposed on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Initial results in identifying trends and anomalies in these data so as to enable the Group to target its limited resources on further investigation have been encouraging.

Recommendations

184. **The Group of Experts recommends that, in order to ensure continued institutional knowledge on the embargo and to improve its capacity to investigate potential violations, a database specific to the arms embargo imposed on the Democratic Republic of the Congo be created and maintained by the Group. This database should contain information collected by all three tiers of the United Nations monitoring mechanism, with the computing capacity necessary to process that information.**

185. **In order to improve data collection by monitoring partners in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Group recommends that the authority of the MONUC mechanism for collecting and reporting information on embargoed material be extended to include additional technical details. The Group suggests that this be set up with the assistance of the Group, taking into account the proposed database on embargoed material.**

186. The Group suggests that the information feedback mechanism be reinforced between the Group of Experts and the MONUC units collecting these data in the field.

187. In cases in which the Group has requested technical information from embargoed material manufacturers and suppliers, the Group requests the Sanctions Committee to use its good offices to encourage prompt replies by Member States to those requests.

J. Measures to be taken in combating the illicit transport of arms and ammunition

188. To disclose the techniques used by transport agents, which have been described in previous reports, the Group of Experts believes that screening is necessary to ensure preventive management of the threat. First of all, the obligation of all contracting States to incorporate international standards in their legislation must be stressed. In addition, measures must be taken to ensure absolute transparency in the transport of arms until they reach their destination.

189. In view of the foregoing, the Group of Experts suggests the following:

(a) Prior authorization must be obtained for non-government air transport of arms;

(b) Operators transporting weapons must file an application for a special licence;

(c) At the time of delivery, brokers must notify the competent authorities of the name of the agents and airlines as well as the itinerary to be followed;

(d) States must take measures against individuals or companies within their jurisdiction who transport arms to destinations and entities subject to a Security Council embargo (adoption of legislation criminalizing the violation of United Nations embargoes). They might also resort to the preventive attachment of aircraft cited in United Nations reports on violations of United Nations embargoes;

(e) There should be systematic control, where possible and depending on the capacities of States, of cargo coming from the territory of States or transiting through them that is known to contain arms and/or ammunition or where the flight plan of the aircraft includes countries subject to United Nations embargoes or States located in a conflict zone;

(f) The air transport sector should be encouraged, through a public or private dialogue, to adopt and promote a code of conduct setting out the measures to be taken in order to ensure that the documents accompanying arms shipments contain complete and accurate information on the goods being shipped and the flight plans.

K. Continuing weakness in Customs and immigration controls

190. With regard to Customs and cross-border migratory flows, the Group of Experts examined the evolution of certain administrative reforms concerning the Office of Customs and Excise and the difficulties encountered in this area. During visits to border control stations and the border crossings, the Group noted that the

presence of agents of the Centre d'évaluation, d'expertise et de certification had been strengthened.

191. Requests for Customs statistics on precious and semi-precious materials that transit through countries neighbouring the Democratic Republic of the Congo have been transmitted to the States concerned, but not yet answered.

192. In the course of its investigations in land, airport and lakeside areas, the Group of Experts uncovered irregularities with regard to Customs procedures that could entail misappropriation of public funds.

193. With regard to migratory flows, the Group of Experts continued to gather information on the movements of businessmen who might be implicated in the illicit trade of natural resources from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Recommendation: enhanced international assistance to improve border security

194. **The continued weakness of the border and immigration controls of the Democratic Republic of the Congo presents a security risk to the nation and the region and a significant drain of financial resources. The Group recommends the strengthening of all agencies in charge of border control, to be supported by further assistance from the international community. Such strengthening would also contribute to the enhanced enforcement of Security Council sanctions.**

L. Children and armed conflict

195. The extension of the Group's mandate to cover investigations into the recruitment, use or targeting of children in armed conflict has introduced new investigative challenges. Research into the area of children in armed conflict necessitates certain safeguards and modifications of the Group's reporting in order to protect sources and their families. Its detailed research on individual cases will be kept confidential.

196. In cases in which sanctioned individuals may remain in contact with the children they have recruited or used, the protection of child witnesses should be taken into account before sanctions are published.

197. The integration of many violators into the officer ranks of FARDC during the present mandate period, including the cases of the Ituri armed groups, some former Mai-Mai officers and the FARDC mixed brigades, does increase the potential of financial and travel sanctions having a coercive effect on the behaviour of these individuals if sanctions were properly implemented by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

198. While the Group of Experts conducts its work independently of child protection agencies, it is greatly concerned about the levels of harassment and threats against child protection staff. In Ituri and the Kivus, threats against these staff members by members of armed groups and FARDC officers have been reported to the Group.

Recommendations

199. **The Committee should engage child protection actors to address issues of protection of vulnerable witnesses before it considers imposing individual sanctions in pursuance of paragraph 13 of resolution 1698 (2006).**

200. **If travel and financial sanctions are to be imposed on members of FARDC who have violated paragraph 13 of resolution 1698 (2006), the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should be made responsible for their enforcement, and this responsibility should include a reporting obligation to the Committee.**

M. Enhancing investigations pursuant to Security Council resolution 1649 (2005)

201. The Group has interviewed a number of former combatants whose leaders have prevented them from joining disarmament programmes in pursuance of resolution 1649 (2005). It has asked questions on financial issues, arms transfers and the use of children in violation of international law, and these interviews have proved to be very valuable in advancing the Group's investigations (see paras. 41-50, 55-74 and 84-105 above). Should its mandate be further extended, the Group would require assistance in the conduct of interviews with former combatants and witnesses concerning the arms embargo.

N. Lack of compliance with sanctions

202. The predominant experience of sanctioned individuals and entities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is that Member States do not enforce the implementation of Security Council sanctions. In Goma, for example, businessman Douglas Mpamo and his company GLBC continue to operate with impunity. Since sanctions were first applied on Mr. Mpamo, GLBC has increased its business activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Mr. Mpamo's business activities are illustrated by the number of movements of his aircraft from Goma airport (see annex V) and as shown in photograph 3.

Photograph 3: Presence of Antonov 12, owned by GLBC, in Goma during the week of 20 to 26 May 2007

203. As mentioned in previous reports of the Group (e.g., S/2006/525, annex, paras. 119 and 215), Mr. Mpamo continues to travel in violation of the travel ban imposed by the Security Council. Also in Goma, the sanctioned non-governmental organization Tous pour la paix et le développement continues to operate with impunity.

Recommendation: assistance in regard to enforcement of sanctions

204. **If lack of enforcement is an expression of political will by Member States, it is the prerogative of the Committee to address this rather than the Group of Experts. If, however, non-enforcement is a result of a lack of capacity of Member States, the Group recommends that its mandate include the task, in cooperation with those countries, of assessing their capacity needs and, where possible, suggesting ways to improve their ability to enforce targeted sanctions.**

Annex I

Entities and organizations contacted by the Group of Experts[1]

Austria

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

Australia

Private sector: Moto Goldmines Ltd., BHP Billiton Limited, Gravity Diamonds, Council for Responsible Jewellery Practices Ltd.

Belgium

Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Federal Police, Justice Department

Organization: Antwerp World Diamond Centre

Private sector: A & M Minerals, Tony Goetz & Zonen, Groupe Forrest, Traxys

Burundi

Government: Ministry of External Relations and International Cooperation

Organization: United Nations Office in Burundi United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi

Canada

Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Organization: International Civil Aviation Organization

Private sector: Banro Corporation, BRC Diamond Corporation, Anvil Mining

Czech Republic

Private sector: Doren Air

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Government: Office of the Special Adviser to the President, Delegation générale du Gouvernment chargée de liaison avec la United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ministry of Mines, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Energy, Direction de l'aeronautique civile, Régie des voies aériennes, Commission for Reconstruction and Development, Ministry of Internal Security, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lubumbashi International Airport, Administration of Province Orientale, Mining Cadastre, Customs and Excise Office, Centre d'évaluation, d'expertise et de la certification, Commission d'évaluation, Central Bank, Vice-Commissioner of Ituri District, General Prosecutor of Ituri District

[1] For security reasons, the names of certain individuals who have provided information or statements to the Group of Experts cannot be listed.

Organizations: European Union, European Union security mission (EUSEC), Peacekeeping Force of the European Union (EUFOR), Pact-Congo, United States Agency for International Development, United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre, United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Diplomatic missions: African Union, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, China, European Union, France, Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America

Private sector: George Forrest International Afrique, Chemaf sprl, MIBA, Gécamines, Safricas, Okimo, Service Air, Sonas, Central African Resources, Mining Processing Congo, Banro Congo Mining, Société Kotecha, Swala Aviation, Service Air, Aurex, Taacep Aviation Congo, Air Navette, Safe Air Co.

France

Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Organization: International Civil Aviation Organization (regional office)

Germany

Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources

Private sector: Danzer AG, Heraeus Holding

Israel

Private sector: DGI Group of Companies

Italy

Organization: World Jewellery Confederation

Kenya

Government: Kenya Customs

Organization: International Crisis Group

Private sector: Mombasa Air Safari, BenAir

Russian Federation

Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Private sector: Norils Nickel

Rwanda

Government: Special Representatives of the Office of the President, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Civil Aviation Authority, Customs and Immigration Office, Ministry of Internal Affairs

Organization: United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Diplomatic missions: France, Germany, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Private sector: Mining Processing Congo

Senegal

Organization: International Civil Aviation Organization, Agence pour la sécurité de la navigation aérienne en Afrique et à Madagascar

South Africa

Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, South African Police Services, Civil Aviation Authority

Organization: Institute for Security Studies, Chamber of Mines of South Africa

Private sector: AngloGold Ashanti, Metorex Limited, SouthernEra Diamonds Inc., Rand Refineries, Aerolift, Harmony, Sentinelle Global Investment

Switzerland

Private sector: Société generale de surveillance SA, Argor-Heraeus

Uganda

Government: Office of the President, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Civil Aviation Authority, Customs Authority, Immigration Authority, Police

Organization: United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Diplomatic missions: Belgium, France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Private sector: Machanga Limited, A.P. Bhimji Limited, Uganda Commercial Impex, Luwero Industries, Showa Trade

Ukraine

Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Administration of Ukraine for Aviation Safety Oversight

Organizations: United Nations Development Programme, European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM)

Private sector: Antonov Design Bureau

United Arab Emirates

Private sector: Dubai Multi Commodities Centre, Emirates Gold

United Republic of Tanzania

Government: Customs Office

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Government: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department for International Development, Treasury Department, All Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes Region

Organizations: Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, International Alert, Human Rights Watch, International Council on Mining and Metals

Private sector: Anglo American, Central African Mining & Exploration Company, First Quantum Minerals Ltd., Tullow Oil plc, Heritage Oil, A&M Group, Crown Agents, ICMM, Group 4 Securicor plc, ArmorGroup International plc, Afrimex, Kroll, Alex Stewart, De Beers, Control Risks

United States of America

Government: Department of the Treasury, Department of State, National Security Council, U.S. Geological Survey

Diplomatic Missions: Democratic Republic of the Congo

Organizations: United Nations (Department of Political Affairs, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), WWF International (Mining Certification Evaluation Project), World Bank, World Diamond Council

Private sector: Phelps Dodge, OM Group, Alex Stewart International, Kroll Corporation, Boeing Company

Annex II

Aviation network around Bukavu



Annex III

Aircraft found in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

N	Immatriculation	No Enregistr	Date enreg	Type acft	No serie	Proprietaire	Exploitant	Base	CDN	Assurance	Remarques
1	9Q-CER	1113	14/01/04	AN-12	2340805		AEROLIFT RSA	BENI	?		
2	9Q-CVE	1116		AN-26	5301		MIDDLAND	BENI	21/07/06		
3	9Q-CSA	1137		AN-26	5005		AEROLIFT RSA	BENI	07/-6/06		
4	9Q-CGM	0146A	17/05/1985	AN-26 B	6401		MANGO AIRLINES	BENI	?		
5	9Q-CAZ	1090	02/05/1991	Let 410 UVP	790205		CETRACA	Beni Wageni	24/02/2007		
6	9Q-CKQ	1093	26/06/85	AN-26	5210		CETRACA	BENI-WAGENI	24/02/07		
7	9Q-CKX	1094	26/6/84	LET 410 UVP-E	790303		CETRACA	BENI-WAGENI	24/02/07		
8	9Q-CBP	606	10/10/1995	Cessna 205	2050118		VAC	BUKAVU	?		
9	9Q-CBL	620	03/01/1994	Partenavia	131		SCIBE AIRLIFT	BUKAVU	?		
10	9Q-CDS	1095	03/11/2005	C 401 A	401A-0129		SWALA	BUKAVU	?		
11	9Q-CXF	1123		SC7 SKYVAN	SH1915		SWALA	BUKAVU	19/08/06		
12	9Q-COL	1149		AN-28	1AJ002-09		MIDDLAND	BUKAVU	17/11/06		
13	9Q-CSW	1150		LET 410 A	730209		SWALA	BUKAVU	?		
14	9Q-COM	1156		AN-28	1AJ008-21		MIDDLAND	BUKAVU	06/12/2006		
15	9Q-CFX		16/03/1978	SKYVAN			SWALA	BUKAVU	?		
16	9Q-CKC		24/01/94	AN-28			AIGLE AVIATION	BUKAVU	?		
17	ER-AJC			AN-28			SWALA	BUKAVU	?		
18	3B-GFI	1	04/04/2001	N-26	1019		AIGLE AVIATION	BUKAVU	?		
19	3C-AAG			AN-12			AIGLE AVIATION	BUKAVU	?		
20	3C-AAL			AN-12			TRAMUNCO	BUKAVU	?		
21	3C-BAA			AN-26			BARON CONGO MINING	BUKAVU	?		
22	3C-DDB			AN-28			BARON CONGO MINING	BUKAVU	?		
23	9Q-CAX	1101	02/10/1989	AN-28	1A100208		Butembo Airlines	Butembo	?		
24	9Q-CAW	1117	08/09/1989	AN-26	2206		MIDDLAND	Butembo	?		
25	9Q-CBO	886	04/02/1995	DHC-6-300	735		TMK	ENTEBBE	RADIE		
26	9Q-CHE	856	18/3/88	KING AIR 90	LJ969		TMK	GOMA	?		
27	9Q-COI	932		CESSNA CARAVANE	345		TMK	GOMA	?		
28	9Q-CBP	961	07/05/1995	F 27 MK 600	10410		TMK	GOMA	?		
29	9Q-CJU	1085	22/6/98	AN-32	1408		AEROLIFT RSA	GOMA	?		
30	9Q-CCW	1104	07/11/2003	CASA 212-20	263		KIVU AIR	GOMA	?		
31	9Q-CCX	1105	12/11/2003	PIPER PA 30	30308		KIVU AIR	GOMA	?		
32	9Q-CAC	1129	12/11/1977	AN-32 B	1407		GLBC	Goma	?		
33	9Q-CCM	1134	12/03/2003	AN-28	IAJ010-04		COMAIR	GOMA	?		
34	9Q-CKC	1135	23/12/1997	AN-28	1AJ009-18		COMAIR	GOMA	23/05/06		
35	9Q-CBQ	1141	12/04/1996	Let 410 UVP	851338		DOREN CONGO	Goma	11/09/2006		
36	9Q-CQZ	1153		LET 410 UVP-E	851339		DOREN AIR CONGO	GOMA	05/11/2006		
37	9Q-CEL	1160	13/1/01	DHC-6-300	719		TMK	GOMA	03/01/2007		
38	9Q-CUB	1167		LET 410 UVP	790325		SAFE AIR COMPANY	GOMA	28/11/06		
39	9Q-CAM		07/11/1978	DC-3			VAC	Goma	?		
40	9Q-CAM		06/12/1978	DC-3	Nil		VAC	Goma	?		
41	9Q-CBO		10/03/1995	DHC-6-300	735		TMK	GOMA	?		
42	9Q-CCX		07/11/2003	DHC-6-300			KIVU AIR	GOMA	?		
43	9Q-CDF		08/05/2004	CESSNA 402B	510		VAC	GOMA	?		
44	9Q-CDM		10/06/2005	B727			BLUE AIRLINES	GOMA	?		
45	9Q-CIA		19/3/04				VAC	GOMA	?		
46	9Q-CIP		20/12/04	AN-32			AEROLIFT RSA	GOMA	?		
47	9Q-CIY		20/7/04				GOMAIR	GOMA	?		
48	9Q-CLV		29/10/02	DC8			LAC	GOMA	?		
49	9Q-CMG		29/4/97	AN-32			GLBC	GOMA	?		
50	9Q-CTN			PARTENAVIA			VAC	GOMA	?		

51	9Q-CTW			C-172			VAC	GOMA	?			
52	9Q-CZH ou HG						VAC	GOMA	?			
53	3D-			LET 410 UVP			GR AVIATION	GOMA	?			
54	3D-ATH			DC-3			AIR LINK	GOMA	?			
55	3D-BOE	CI No 269	06/09/2003	B727	18933		GLBC	GOMA	?			
56	3D-BOZ			HELICO	2160		SAFE AIR COMPANY	GOMA	?			
57	3D-DEN			LET 410 UVP	892325		ECHO FLIGHT	GOMA	?			
58	3D-ERS			LET 410 UVP			DOREN AIR AFRICA	GOMA	?			
59	3D-KMJ			B727	19892		MANGO MAT	GOMA	?			
60	3D-PFI			VISCOUNT			MANGO MAT	GOMA	?			
61	3D-SBZ			IL 18 D			MANGO MAT	GOMA	?			
62	5N-BCB	4	15/05/01	Fairchild FH 227	558		MANGO MAT	GOMA	?			
63	5Y-ARB			C-206			SERVICE AIR	GOMA	?			
64	5Y-BKA			BE-200			VAC	GOMA	?			
65	5Y-BTP			TWIN OTTER	104			GOMA	?			
66	5Y-EOE			BE 1900C	UC-90			GOMA	?			
67	9L-LBM			LET 410 UVP				GOMA	?			
68	9L-LEM			LET 410 UVP			GLBC	GOMA	?			
69	9U-BHM			AN-26			ECHO FLIGHT	GOMA	?			
70	9U-BHN			AN-12				GOMA	?			
71	9U-BHO			AN-12				GOMA	?			
72	9U-BHR			AN-28				GOMA	?			
73	9XR-EJ			LET 410 UVP				GOMA	?			
74	9XR-KI			AN-28				GOMA	?			
75	9XR-KV			AN-28				GOMA	?			Radie
76	EL-WVA			AN-8			AIR SERV	GOMA	?			Radie
77	3C-QQT			AN-32			AIR SERV	GOMA	?			
78	3C-AAL			AN-12			GLBC	GOMA	?			
79	3C-AAG			AN-12			CHC STELLAVIA	GOMA	?			
							Air Navette	KISANGANI	?			Base a Entebbe

Annex IV

Diplomatic note on natural resource smugglers and arms traffickers

LE CONSULAT DE LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO AU BURUNDI
A BUJUMBURA

N° de Référence : 19/CSI/AR/2005 Bujumbura, le 28/12/2005

Concerne : BULLETIN D'INVESTIGATION CONSTATS REALISES AU COURS DE CE MOIS DE DECEMBRE 20005 AU CONSULAT DE LA R.D CBURUNDI

Suivant nos Bulletins d'informations et d'investigations précédemment vous envoyés, aujourd'hui nous sommes interpellés par BUKAVU et KINSHASA sur la situation que prévaut à la Frontière de KAVIMVIRA, toujours rogés dans les trafics illicites et exportations illégales des marchandises et matières precieuses et minérales de provenance du Congo vers le Burundi.
Ces bulletins envoyés à Uvira et Bukavu n'apportent pas aucune solution ou résultat escompté ; des fraudes massives des marchandises et produits miniers considérables sont enregistrés et traversés dans une corruption des agents frontaliers (OFIDA, ANR, DGM et Commerce extérieur) voire avec la complicité des Autorités administratives et militaires de la place.
La Police Nationale congolaise sous le Groupe Mobile d'Intervention (GMI) Service spécialisé et formé pour ces attributions de la surveillance de la frontière et la lutte contre les fraudes (Anti-fraudes) et son écarté à l'accès des opérations de la douane.
Ainsi, nous avons de nouveaux dressé une nouvelle liste des personnes impliquées et démasquées à nos précédents Bulletins et en les interpellons à la JUSTICE tout en démontrant les genres des produits et marchandises illégalement fraudées et ajoutons ce qui particent avec les ennemis du Congo, en facilitant l'entrée d'armées et munitions aux insurgés du Haut-Plateau.

1. Trafiquants illégaux des matières précieuses et minérales
   1) LUKALA : Président des acheteurs d'or
   2) NDINGARI : Président transitaire
   3) Honoré : Acheteur d'or , Av. de l'Authenticité
   4) MAZEE : Acheteur d'or, Av. Mulongwe
   5) MWITE : Acheteur d'or, Av. Fizi
   6) KARUBA NDINGARI : Acheteur d'or
2. Exportateurs illégaux des marchandises du Congo Wes produits divers
   1) NDINGARI : Président et grand trafiquant (aucun document d'exportation)
   2) Maman MBIRIZI OBE : Présidente des mamans trafiquantes
   3) Monsieur Jean ROBERT
   4) Madame DOMINA
   5) Madame KYUBWA REGINA 6) Maman VUMILIA 7) Maman IDIAMINE
   8) Maman SOLI ASSANI 9) Maman NOEZI 10) Maman KIVUNDE
   11) Maman KIBIBI 12) Maman CECILE 13) Maman THERESE
   14) Maman SANGANI 15) Maman l'AKAWANDJA
3. Trafiquants d'armes et munitions
   1) Jean ROBERT 2) NDINGARI (Kenya) 3) VUMILIA (Afro-Hima)
   4) Madame NOEZI (Afro-Hima) 5) MAZEE (Afro-Hima/Burundi) 6) LUBAI JBA

Que la Police Nationale Congolaise Uvira-Bukavu convoque et interpelle judiciairement toutes ces personnes citées ci-haut.

POUR LE CONSULAT DE LA R.D.C AU BURUNDI BUJUMBURA

Le Chef de Service de Sécurité et Intelligence à Ambassade au BURUNDI

ABDALLAH

Annex V

Record of air traffic at Goma airport

								Arrivée								Départ							
Date	Immatriculation	Type d'Aéronef	Nbre Mot.	PMAD (T)	Pilote	Exploitant	Nat. vol (IFR, VFR, mixte, mil.)	Provenance	Heure Arr.	Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	Fret	Destination	Heure dép.	Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	Fret/D
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg	WALIKALE	9 45	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg	WALIKALE	11 41	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg	WALIKALE	8 31	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	8 59	H	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	10 1	H	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg	WALIKALE	13 30	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	11 30	H	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	7 41	H	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg	WALIKALE	10 25	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	10 32	H	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg	WALIKALE	12 7	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg	WALIKALE	8 5	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	12 46	H	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg	WALIKALE	14 27	Non		0	0		7000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	7 30	H	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg	WALIKALE	11 40	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	7 18	H	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg	WALIKALE	14 7	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg	WALIKALE	8 55	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	10 2	H	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	13 22	H	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	7 22	H	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg	WALIKALE	8 6	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg	WALIKALE	11 25	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg	WALIKALE	8 5	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg	WALIKALE	11 24	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	8 43	H	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	9QCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	OSAIR	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	8 51	H	0	0	0	0	1400,00

									Arrivée								Départ								
Date	Immatri	Type d'Aeronef	Nbre Mot.	PMAD (T)	Pilote	Exploitant	Nat. vol (SR, VI, NNR, INR)	Provenc	Heure. Ar	Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	Fret	Destinat	Heure dép	Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	FretD
	6OCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	COMAIR	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	10 27	N	0	0	0	0	3000,00
	6OCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	COMAIR	N Hdg	WALIKALE	12 2	Non	0	0	0	0	3000,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	6OCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	COMAIR	N Hdg	WALIKALE	14 30	Non	0	0	0	0	3000,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	6OCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	COMAIR	N Hdg	WALIKALE	9 35	Non	0	0	0	0	3000,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	6OCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	COMAIR	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	12 00	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
	6OCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	COMAIR	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	7 5	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
	6OCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	COMAIR	N Hdg	WALIKALE	11 20	Non	0	0	0	0	3000,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	6OCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	COMAIR	N Hdg	WALIKALE	14 15	Non	0	0	0	0	3000,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	6OCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	COMAIR	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	9 40	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
	6OCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	COMAIR	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	12 41	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
	6OCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	COMAIR	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	6 1	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
	6OCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	COMAIR	N Hdg	WALIKALE	8 30	Non	0	0	0	0	3000,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	6OCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	COMAIR	N Hdg	WALIKALE	9 15	Non	0	0	0	0	3000,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	6OCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	COMAIR	N Hdg	WALIKALE	10 30	Non	0	0	0		3000,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	6OCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	COMAIR	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	12 0	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
	6OCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	COMAIR	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	7 50	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
	6OCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	COMAIR	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	7 22	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
	6OCIY	L410	2	6	SERGEY	COMAIR	N Hdg	WALIKALE	13 00	Non	0	0	0	0	3000,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	159								SFTotal					0	114000				0	0	0	0	84000
		COZA																					
	6OCLA	AN26	2	24		COZA	N Hdg	BUKAVU	12 32	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	6OCLA	AN26	2	24	VICTOR	COZA	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KISANGANI	13 35	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
	2								SFTotal					0	0				0	0	0	0	

Date	Immatriculation	Type d'Aéronef	Nbre Mot.	PMAD (T)	Pilote	Exploitant	Nat. vol (pax, cc, MIL, DIV)	Arrivée							Départ							
								Provenance	Heure Arr	Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	Poid	Destinat	Heure dép	Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	PoidD
		DOREN																					
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg	WALIKALE	14 21	Nbre	0	0	0	0	2000,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	13 52	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	9 47	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	15 39	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg	BUKAVU	14 57	Nbre	4	0	0	4	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg	WALIKALE	11 37	Nbre	0	0	0	0	2000,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg	WALIKALE	15 1	Nbre	0	0	0	0	2000,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	11 34	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg	WALIKALE	12 08	Nbre	0	0	0	0	2000,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	11 15	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg	WALIKALE	9 28	Nbre	0	0	0	0	2000,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg	WALIKALE	15 10	Nbre	0	0	0	0	2000,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	7 34	N	0	0	0	0	1600,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	15 5	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	15 40	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	9 33	N	3	0	0	3	1600,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg	WALIKALE	10 11	Nbre	0	0	0	0	2000,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg	WALIKALE	11 12	Nbre	6	0	0	0	3000,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	10 33	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	13 01	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	9 37	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg	WALIKALE	7 07	Nbre	0	0	0	0	3000,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg	WALIKALE	12 7	Nbre	0	0	0	0	3000,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg	WALIKALE	15 23	Nbre	0	0	0	0	3000,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg	WALIKALE	9 26	Nbre	0	0	0	0	3000,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg	WALIKALE	6 58	Nbre	0	0	0	0	2000,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DOREN	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	10 11	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00

								Arrivée								Départ							
Date	Immatr	Type d'Aeronef	Nbre Mot.	PMAD (T)	Pilote	Exploitant	Mat. vol (IFR, IF, nuit, OAT)	Provenan	Heure. Ar	Bpl	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	Fret	Destinat	Heure dép	Bpl	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	FretD
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	6 50	N	4	0	0	4	1400,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg	WALIKALE	11 48	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	12 8	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg	WALIKALE	5 41	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	6 52	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg	WALIKALE	13 39	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	12 20	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	10 15	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg	WALIKALE	11 46	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg	WALIKALE	13 52	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	6 14	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg	WALIKALE	7 44	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg	WALIKALE	12 30	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	L41	[illegible]	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	10 40	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	6 20	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	6 15	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg	WALIKALE	7 47	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg	WALIKALE	10 30	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg	WALIKALE	14 35	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	13 0	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	10 45	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg	WALIKALE	12 58	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	11 30	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg	WALIKALE	13 15	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg	WALIKALE	11 0	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	9 32	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg	WALIKALE	14 35	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	[illegible]	N Hdg	WALIKALE	8 12	Non	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00

								Arrivée								Départ							
Date	Immatriculation	Type d'Aéronef	Nbre Mot.	PMAD (T)	PNote	Exploitant	Nat. vol (IFR, IR, VFR, DNI)	Provenance	Heure. Arr	Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	Fret	Destinat.	Heure dép	Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	Fret/D
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	12 33	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	7 25	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg	WALIKALE	9 0	Non	0	0	0	0	2333,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg	WALIKALE	11 49	Non	0	0	0	0	2333,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	13 52	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	7 9	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	9 34	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg	WALIKALE	10 20	Non	0	0	0	0	2800,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg	BUKAVU	11 05	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BUKAVU	8 36	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg	WALIKALE	14 22	Non	0	0	0	0	2333,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	12 48	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg	WALIKALE	10 45	Non	0	0	0	0	2333,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	8 9	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	12 30	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	7 48	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg	WALIKALE	8 34	Non	0	0	0	0	2800,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg	WALIKALE	14 1	Non	0	0	0	0	2333,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg		-		0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	8 7	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg	WALIKALE	10 35	Non	0	0	0	0	2800,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg	WALIKALE	11 11	Non	0	0	0	0	2800,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	8 32	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg	WALIKALE	15 49	Non	0	0	0	0	2800,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	13 51	N	1	0	0	1	1400,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg	LULIMGUTB [illegible]	12 19	Non	0	0	0	0	1400,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	LUBUTU	8 27	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg	WALIKALE	7 8	Non	0	0	0	0	2800,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DSCAQ	L410	2	6	YOURI	DORBH	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	WALIKALE	5 40	N	0	0	0	0	1500,00

Date	Immatri	Type d'Aeronef	Nbre équi.	PMAD (T)	Pilote	Exploitant	Nat. vol (NR, IT, ISNR, (NR)	Arrivée								Départ							
								Provena	Heure. Ar	Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	Fret	Destinat	Heure dép		Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	FretD.
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOUSI	DORDH	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00								
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOUSI	DORDH	N Hdg	WALWALE	14 30	Nan	0	0	0	0	2000,00	WALWALE	15 0	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOUSI	DORDH	N Hdg										-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	DBCAQ	L410	2	6	YOUSI	DORDH	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	GHABUNDA	0 24	N	0	0	0	0	1400,00
							N Hdg	GHABUNDA	12 30	Nan	0	0	0	0	2000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	07								STotal					00	7000				0	0	0	0	5600

Date	Immatri	Type d'Aeronef	Nbre Mot.	PMAD (T)	Pilote	Exploitant	Nat. vol (sev, st, NNR, (Ad))	Arrivée							Départ							
								Provenc	Heure. Ar	Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	Frat	Destinat	Heure dép		Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	FretD
		ECHO																						
	9VSTP	DHC6	2	15	CHENE	ECHO	N Hdg	MANONO	9 50	Non	1	0	0	1	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	9VSTP	DHC6	2	15	CHENE	ECHO	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	MANONO	6 1	N	0	0	0	0	3000,00
	ZSBOG	C208	1	2	LEROUX	ECHO	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KASONGO	6 50	N	0	0	0	0	150,00
	9VSTP	DHC6	2	15	CHENE	ECHO	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BUNIA	6 50	N	1	0	0	1	1650,00
	9VSTP	DHC6	2	15	CHENE	ECHO	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KINSHASAH	10 23	N	10	0	0	10	0,00
	ZSBOG	C208	1	2	LEROUX	ECHO	N Hdg	KASONGO	10 16	Non	1	0	0	1	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	9VSTP	DHC6	2	15	CHENE	ECHO	N Hdg	BENI	9 2	Non	2	0	0	2	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	9VSTP	DHC6	2	15	CHENE	ECHO	N Hdg	BENI	14 17	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	9VSTP	DHC6	2	15	CHENE	ECHO	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BUNIA	11 4	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
	ZSBOG	C208	1	4	LEROUX	ECHO	N Hdg	KALEMBWE	10 0	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	9VSTP	DHC6	2	15	CHENE	ECHO	N Hdg	KINSHASAV	10 13	Non	12	0	0	12	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	ZSBOG	C208	1	4	LEROUX	ECHO	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BUKAVU	6 55	N	2	0	0	2	0,00
	9VSTP	DHC6	2	15	CHENE	ECHO	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KALEMBE	6 36	N	4	0	0	4	225,00
	ZSBOG	C208	1	4	LEROUX	ECHO	N Hdg	BUKAVU	12 25	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	ZSBOG	C208	1	4	LEROUX	ECHO	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BUKAVU	7 5	N	4	0	0	4	0,00
	ZSBOG	C208	1	4	LEROUX	ECHO	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	MANONO	6 48	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
	ZSBOG	C208	1	4	LEROUX	ECHO	N Hdg	MANONO	12 53	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	9VSTP	DHC6	2	6		ECHO	N Hdg	MITWABA	10 16	Non	1	0	0	1	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	ZSBOG	C208	1	4	LEROUX	ECHO	N Hdg	KASONGO	12 27	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	ZSBOG	C208	1	4	LEROUX	ECHO	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BUKAVU	7 48	N	2	0	0	2	0,00
	9VSTP	DHC6	2	15	CHENE	ECHO	N Hdg	NAIROBI	14 0	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	9VSTP	DHC6	2	15	CHENE	ECHO	I Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	NAIROBI	5 41	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
	9VSTP	DHC6	2	15	CHENE	ECHO	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BUNIA	6 26	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
	9VSTP	DHC6	2	15	CHENE	ECHO	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KINSHASAH	10 41	N	22	0	0	22	0,00
	ZSBOG	C208	1	4	LEROUX	ECHO	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BUKAVU	6 42	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
	ZSBOG	C208	1	4	LEROUX	ECHO	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BUKAVU	6 42	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
	9VSTP	DHC6	2	15	CHENE	ECHO	N Hdg	BUNIA	6 50	Non	0	0	0	0	1650,00				0	0	0	0	0,00

Date	Immatriculation	Type d'aéronef	Nbre Moteurs	PMAD (T)	Pilote	Exploitant	Nat. vol (NIT, ST, NAT, INT)	Arrivée								Départ							
								Provenance	Heure Arr	Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	Fret	Destination	Heure départ	Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	Fret/D
							N Hdg	MWEMBWE	10 43	Nav	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
											0	0	0	0	0,00	KABONGO	0 17	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg	KABONGO	10 30	Nav	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	Moshi	12 9	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg	BOBHOE	13 10	Nav	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg	Moshi	16 24	Nav	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg	KAMITUGA	8 30	Nav	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KABONGO	10 13	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BUKAVU	8 52	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg	BUKAVU	14 22	Nav	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KALEMIE(NSH)	5 52	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg	MOBA	18 13	Nav	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg	MWEMBWE	12 12	Nav	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KALEMIE	7 12	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KABONGO	7 4	N	2	0	0	2	0,00
							N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KAMITUGA	7 51	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg	KABONGO	10 10	02	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg	BUKAVU	10 15	Nav	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg	BUKAVU	14 0	Nav	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BUKAVU	10 56	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg	BUKA	6 30	Nav	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg	Moshi	10 56	Nav	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	Moshi	7 13	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BUKA	5 38	N	0	0	0	0	500,00
							N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BOBHOE	9 50	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	Moshi	7 20	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg	MANDAKA	12 10	Nav	3	0	0	3	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
							N Hdg	BUKAVU	14 0	Nav	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00

									Arrivée								Départ							
Date	Immatriculation	Type d'Aeronef	Nbre Mot.	PMAD (T)	Pilote	Exploitant	Mat. vol (IFR, VI, MIX, SVE)	Provenance	Heure Arr	Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	Pmt	Destination	Heure dép	Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	PmtD
[illegible]	28BOG	C208	1	4	LEROUX	BOM	H Hdg	KASONGO	10 47	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	28BOG	C208	1	4	LEROUX	BOM	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KASONGO	7 20	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	5YBTP	DHC8	2	15	CHENE	BOM	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BUKAVU	10 10	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	5YBTP	DHC8	2	15	CHENE	BOM	H Hdg	BUKAVU	9 30	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	5YBTP	DHC8	2	15	CHENE	BOM	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BUNIA	8 31	N	3	0	0	3	1800,00
[illegible]	5YBTP	DHC8	2	15		BOM	H Hdg	MALEMBAIE	13 2	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	28BOG	C208	1	4	LEROUX	BOM	H Hdg	MANONO	12 8	Non	1	0	0	1	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	28BOG	C208	1	4	LEROUX	BOM	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	MANONO	8 02	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	28BOG	C208	1	4	LEROUX	BOM	H Hdg	KASONGO	10 11	Non	1	0	0	1	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	5YBTP	DHC8	2	15	CHENE	BOM	I Hdg	NAIROBI	15 40	Non	1	0	0	1	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	5YBTP	DHC8	2	15	CHENE	BOM	I Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	NAIROBI	5 31	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	5YBTP	DHC8	2	15	CHENE	BOM	H Hdg	BUNIA	8 38	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	28BOG	C208	1	4		BOM	I Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	ENTEBBE	7 57	N	2	0	0	2	2000,00
[illegible]	5YBTP	DHC8	2	15	CHENE	BOM	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	MBANDAKA	8 31	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	5YBTP	DHC8	2	15	CHENE	BOM	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BUNIA	5 40	N	0	0	0	0	1200,00
[illegible]	5YBTP	DHC8	2	15	CHENE	BOM	H Hdg	KINSHASA	10 35	Non	13	0	0	13	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	5YBTP	DHC8	2	15	CHENE	BOM	H Hdg	BUNIA	14 55	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	28BOG	C208	1	4	LEROUX	BOM	H Hdg	Medo	16 07	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	28BOG	C208	1	4	LEROUX	BOM	I Hdg	ENTEBBE	8 20	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	28BOG	C208	1	4	LEROUX	BOM	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BUKAVU	11 20	N	3	0	0	3	0,00
[illegible]	5YBTP	DHC8	2	15	CHENE	BOM	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BUNIA	12 6	N	6	0	0	6	984,00
[illegible]	28BOG	C208	1	4	LEROUX	BOM	H Hdg	BUKAVU	11 25	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	5YBTP	DHC8	2	15	CHENE	BOM	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KALEMIE	6 56	N	3	0	0	3	985,00
[illegible]	28BOG	C208	1	4	LEROUX	BOM	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BUKAVU	7 0	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	28BOG	C208	1	4	LEROUX	BOM	H Hdg	MANONO	14 7	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	28BOG	C208	1	4	LEROUX	BOM	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	MANONO	6 0	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	5YBTP	DHC8	2	15	LEROUX	BOM	H Hdg	MOBA	15 23	Non	11	0	0	11	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	5YBTP	DHC8	2	15		BOM	H Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KINSHASA	10 32	N	10	0	0	10	0,00

Date	Immatriculation	Type d'Aéronef	Nbre Mot.	PMAD (T)	Pilote	Exploitant	Nat. vol (INT, IT, MIX, DIV)	Arrivée								Départ							
								Provenance	Heure. Ar	Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	Fret	Destinat	Heure dép		Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	FretD
	ZS[illegible]	C208	1	4		[illegible]	N Hdg	KASONGO	10 42	Non	1	0	0	1	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	9Y[illegible]	DHC8	2	15	LEROUX	[illegible]	N Hdg	GOM	11 27	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	9Y[illegible]	DHC8	2	15		[illegible]	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KINSHASA	15	10	H	10	0	0	10	0,00
	ZS[illegible]	C208	1	4		[illegible]	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KASONGO	7	30	H	0	0	0	0	0,00
	07							BTotal						01	0000					0	0	00	10197
FAC																							
	9R-[illegible]	MI-8MTV	2	15		FAC	N Hdg	UVIRA	7 3	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	9R-[illegible]	MI-8MTV	2	15		FAC	N Hdg	BUKAVU	13 15	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	9R-[illegible]	MI-8MTV	2	15		FAC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BUKAVU	0	3	H	0	0	0	0	0,00
	9R-[illegible]	MI-8MTV	2	15		FAC	N Hdg	BUKAVU	11 4	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	6							BTotal						0	0					0	0	0	0
FREE AIR																							
	9QSUB	L410	2	6		FREE AIR	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	LUBUMBASHI	12	36	H	0	0	0	0	0,00
	1							BTotal						0	0					0	0	0	0
GALAXY KAVATSI																							
	9QCVE	AN26	2	24	BORIS	GALAXY KAVATSI	N Hdg	BENI	10 35	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCVE	AN26	2	24	BORIS	GALAXY KAVATSI	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BENI	11	35	H	0	0	0	0	0,00
	EK72602	AN72	2	27	VLADIMIR	GALAXY KAVATSI	N Hdg	[illegible]	13 48	Non	10	0	0	15	450,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	EK72602	AN72	2	27	VLADIMIR	GALAXY KAVATSI	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BENI	13	54	H	0	0	0	0	5000,00
	EK72602	AN72	2	27	VALERY	GALAXY KAVATSI	N Hdg	BENI	12 51	Non	7	0	0	7	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	EK72602	AN72	2	27	VALERY	GALAXY KAVATSI	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BUKAVU	15	30	H	5	0	0	5	0,00
	EK72602	AN72	2	27		GALAXY KAVATSI	N Hdg	BUKAVU	14 58	Non	10	0	0	10	0,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	EK72602	AN72	2	27		GALAXY KAVATSI	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	TSHUMBE	11	5	H	7	0	0	7	6000,00
	EK72602	AN72	2	27		GALAXY KAVATSI	N Hdg	TSHUMBE	15 18	Non	0	0	0	0	6000,00				0	0	0	0	0,00
	9							BTotal						27	6450					0	0	22	23000

Date	Immatri	Type d'Aéronef	Nbre Mot.	PM/AD (T)	Pilote	Exploitant	Bal. vol (IFR, IR, VMR, SNR)	Arrivée							Départ							
								Provenc	Heure. Ar	Bal	AD	CHD	SNF	TOT	Fret	Destinat	Heure dép	Bal	AD	CHD	SNF	TOT	FretD
	GLBC																					
	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLBC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KALEMAKANI	12 0	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLBC	N Hdg	KALEMAKA	14 00	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCBQ	AN12	4	61	MYKOLAS	GLBC	N Hdg	Kindu	15 0	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCBQ	AN12	4	61	MIKOLAS	GLBC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	Kindu	11 22	N	10	0	0	10	17100,0
	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLBC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KALEMAKANI	12 0	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCBQ	AN12	4	61	MYKOLAS	GLBC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	Kindu	11 22	N	10	0	0	10	17100,0
	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLBC	N Hdg	PUNIA	10 10	Non	2	0	0	2	4000,00	-	-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLBC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	PUNIA	6 57	N	2	0	0	2	10400,0
	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLBC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	PUNIA	6 57	N	2	0	0	2	10400,0
	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLBC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KONGOLO	9 50	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLBC	N Hdg	KONGOLO	14 25	Non	0	0	0	0	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCBQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLBC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KISANGANI	11 12	N	0	0	0	0	17000,0
	9QCBQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLBC	N Hdg	KISANGANI	15 30	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	ALEX	GLBC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KALEMAKANI	13 7	N	3	0	0	3	6300,00
	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	ALEX	GLBC	N Hdg	KALEMAKA	15 00	Non	3	0	0	3	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	ALEX	GLBC	N Hdg	PUNIA	12 00	Non	3	0	0	3	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	ALEX	GLBC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	PUNIA	6 30	N	0	0	0	0	10700,0
	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLBC	N Hdg	KONGOLO	14 10	Non	0	0	0	0	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLBC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KONGOLO	9 30	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCMG	AN12	4	61	IGOR	GLBC	N Hdg	MANONO	10 13	Non	0	0	0	0	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLBC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KONGOLO	7 5	N	0	0	0	0	6100,00
	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLBC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KONGOLO	7 5	N	0	0	0	0	6100,00
	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLBC	N Hdg	LODJA	13 4	03	0	0	0	0	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLBC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	LODJA	8 20	N	0	0	0	0	9500,00
	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLBC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KONGOLO	7 11	N	0	0	0	0	10000,0
	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLBC	N Hdg	KONGOLO	11 57	Non	2	0	0	2	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLBC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	LODJA	8 30	N	1	0	0	1	9900,00

								Arrivée									Départ									
Date	Immatri	Type d'Aeronef	Nbre Mot.	PSAD (T)	Pilote	Exploitant	Nat. vol (INT, IT, HER, HER)	Provena	Heure. Ar	Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	Fret	Destinat	Heure dép	Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	FretD
	9QCM9	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég	LODJA	10 32	Non	2	0	0	2	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCM9	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	LODJA	6 39	N	0	0	0	0	1,00
	9QCBQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLSC	N Nég	VOL-LOCAL	15 39	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCM9	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég	KONGOLO	11 56	Non	0	0	0	0	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCBQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	VOL-LOCAL	14 58	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCM9	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	KONGOLO	7 40	N	3	0	0	3	6300,00
	9QCM9	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég	MAKONO	11 35	Non	0	0	0	0	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCBQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLSC	N Nég	KISANGANI	16 14	Non	0	0	0	0	8000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCBQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	KISANGANI	10 49	N	0	0	0	0	16000,0
	9QCM9	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	KONGOLO	6 14	N	1	0	0	1	6000,00
	9QCBQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLSC	N Nég	KISANGANI	16 21	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCBQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	KISANGANI	10 48	N	0	0	0	0	16000,0
	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	YOURI	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	VOL-LOCAL	11 48	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCM9	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég	PUNIA	15 39	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	YOURI	GLSC	N Nég	VOL-LOCAL	12 4	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCM9	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	PUNIA	7 42	N	0	0	0	0	10000,0
	9QCM9	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég	PUNIA	11 2	Non	0	0	0	0	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCM9	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	PUNIA	12 44	N	0	0	0	0	16000,0
	9QCBQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	Mado	15 47	N	0	0	0	0	17000,0
	9QCBQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLSC	N Nég	Mado	16 54	Non	7	0	0	7	2800,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCBQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	Mado	10 48	N	10	0	0	10	17000,0
	9QCM9	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég	LODJA	11 8	Non	0	0	0	0	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCBQ	AN12	4	61	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég	Mado	14 7	Non	0	0	0	0	10000,0		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég	KABALO	15 37	Non	0	0	0	0	1500,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	9QCM9	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	LODJA	6 12	N	0	0	0	0	6000,00
	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	MAKONO	11 48	N	0	0	0	0	6300,00
	9QCBQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	KISANGANI	9 31	N	0	0	0	0	16000,0
	9QCM9	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég	PUNIA	11 7	Non	2	0	0	2	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00

									Arrivée									Départ									
Date	Immatr	Type d'Aeronef	Nbre Mot.	PMAD (T)	Pilote	Exploitant	Nat. vol (INT, IR, NAR, MIL)	Provenance	Heure. Ar	Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	Fret	Destinat	Heure dép	Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	FretD
[illegible]	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	KONGOLO	11 35	N	0	0	0	0	6000,00
[illegible]	9QCGQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLSC	N Nég	KISANGANI	15 35	Non	0	0	0	0	9600,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég	KONGOLO	16 44	Non	0	0	0	0	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	Mindu	11 58	N	0	0	0	0	6750,00
[illegible]	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	KALIMAKAMI	6 6	N	0	0	0	0	9000,00
[illegible]	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég	KALIMAKA	15 50	Non	0	0	0	0	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég	KALIMAKA	11 25	Non	0	0	0	0	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	Mindu	6 51	N	0	0	0	0	6000,00
[illegible]	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég	MANONO	11 54	Non	0	0	0	0	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCGQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLSC	N Nég	KISANGANI	12 15	Non	0	0	0	0	19200,0		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég	PUMA	15 18	Non	0	0	0	0	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	KONGOLO	5 33	N	4	0	0	4	8000,00
[illegible]	9QCGQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	KISANGANI	6 55	N	0	0	0	0	17600,0
[illegible]	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	PUMA	12 4	N	0	0	0	0	9600,00
[illegible]	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	KALIMAKAMI	13 34	N	0	0	0	0	6000,00
[illegible]	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	KALEMIE	6 24	N	6	0	0	6	3960,00
[illegible]	9QCGQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	KISANGANI	6 58	N	0	0	0	0	18300,0
[illegible]	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég	KALIMAKA	15 50	Non	2	0	0	2	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég	MANONO	13 10	Non	0	0	0	0	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCGQ	AN12	4	61	VLADIMIR	GLSC	N Nég	KISANGANI	11 42	Non	0	0	0	0	10800,0		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCGQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	Mindu	6 53	N	7	0	0	7	17300,0
[illegible]	9QCGQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLSC	N Nég	Mindu	13 18	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	NYUNGU	7 59	N		0	0		7562,00
[illegible]	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég	KONGOLO	12 58	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCGQ	AN12	4	61	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég	Mindu	15 50	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég	PUMA	14 38	Non	3		0		4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	Mindu	8 51	N	0	0	0	0	10200,0
[illegible]	9QCGQ	AN12	4	61	IGOR	GLSC	N Nég				0	0	0	0	0,00	Mindu	9 52	N	5	0	0	5	17400,0

Date	Immatri	Type d'Aeronef	Nbre Mot.	PMAD (T)	Pilote	Exploitant	Mat. vol (HR, IR, NVR, Intg	Arrivée							Départ							
								Provenan	Heure. Ar	Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	Fret	Destinat	Heure dép	Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	FretD
[illegible]	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Hdg	Kindu	11 30	Non	0	0	0	0	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCM9	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Hdg	LODJA	15 45	Non	0	0	0	0	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCM9	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	LODJA	11 50	N	0	0	0	0	10000,0 A
[illegible]	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	BUKAVU	5 55	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCM9	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Hdg	KONGOLO	15 4	Non		0	0		4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCGQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLSC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	Kindu	6 30	N	0	0	0	0	14000,0 A
[illegible]	9QCM9	AN32	2	27	DOWSON	GLSC	N Hdg	Kindu	15 4		0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Hdg	KONGOLO	10 10	Non	0	0	0	0	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCGQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLSC	N Hdg	Kindu	10 50	Non	0	0	0	0	9000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCM9	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KONGOLO	10 40	N	0	0	0	0	6662,00
[illegible]	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KONGOLO	8 10	N	2	0	0	2	8000,00
[illegible]	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	YOURI	GLSC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	TSHIKAPA	6 4	N	0	0	0	0	2000,00
[illegible]	9QCGQ	AN12	4	61	SERGY	GLSC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KISANGANI	6 35	N	0	0	0	0	18000,0 A
[illegible]	9QCGQ	AN12	4	61		GLSC	N Hdg	KISANGANI	11 1	Non	0	0	0	0	16000,0 A		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCGQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLSC	N Hdg	Kindu	12 35	Non	0	0	0	0	14000,0 A		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	YOURI	GLSC	N Hdg	KISANGANI	15 34	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCGQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLSC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	Kindu	5 0	N	0	0	0	0	1700,00
[illegible]	9QCM9	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Hdg	KALIMAKA	10 21	Non	0	0	0	0	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KONGOLO	10 50	N	3	0	0	3	6700,00
[illegible]	9QCM9	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KALIMAKAMI	7 30	N	0	0	0	0	9000,00
[illegible]	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Hdg	KONGOLO	15 0	Non	0	0	0	0	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCGQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLSC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	Kindu	6 5	N	5	0	0	5	17000,0 A
[illegible]	9QCGQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLSC	N Hdg	Kindu	13 35	Non	5	0	0	5	19000,0 A		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCM9	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KONGOLO	9 55	N	0	0	0	0	6600,00
[illegible]	9QCM9	AN32	2	27	YOURI	GLSC	N Hdg	MANONO	11 30	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	KONGOLO	11 55	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Hdg	KONGOLO	6 20	Non	0	0	0	0	4000,00		-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCM9	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLSC	N Hdg				0	0	0	0	0,00	LODJA	14 27	N	0	0	0	0	10000,0 A

									Arrivée								Départ							
Date	Immatri	Type d'Aeronef	Nbre Mot.	PMAD (T)	Pilote	Exploitant	Nat. vol (PR, IR, NVR, INT)		Provena	Heure. Ar	Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	Fret	Destinat	Heure dép	Bal	AD	CHD	INF	TOT	FretD
[illegible]	9QCDQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLEC	N Hdg		Mindu	11 9	Non	0	0	0	0	8000,00	-	-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCDQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLEC	N Hdg		-			0	0	0	0	0,00	Mindu	6 32	N	0	0	0	0	18000,0 0
[illegible]	9QCAC	AN12	4	61	IGOR	GLEC	N Hdg		-			0	0	0	0	0,00	TSHIKAPA	6 41	N	0	0	0	0	1000,00
[illegible]	9QCAC	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLEC	N Hdg		KANANGA	16 51	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00	-	-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLEC	N Hdg		LODJA	7 58	Non	0	0	0	0	0000,00	-	-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCDQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLEC	N Hdg		KISANGANI	13 4	Non	0	0	0	0	1033,00	-	-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLEC	N Hdg		-			0	0	0	0	0,00	BENI	11 38	N	0	0	0	0	6500,00
[illegible]	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLEC	N Hdg		BENI	10 47	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00	-	-		0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCDQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLEC	N Hdg		-			0	0	0	0	0,00	KISANGANI	7 11	N	0	0	0	0	18181,0 0
[illegible]	9QCMG	AN32	2	27	IGOR	GLEC	N Hdg		-			0	0	0	0	0,00	BENI	8 53	N	0	0	0	0	0,00
[illegible]	9QCDQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLEC	N Hdg		-			0	0	0	0	0,00	Mindu	12 9	N	0	0	0	0	18000,0 0
[illegible]	9QCDQ	AN12	4	61	VALERY	GLEC	N Hdg		Mindu	15 51	Non	0	0	0	0	0,00	-	-		0	0	0	0	0,00
	122									S/Total					45	243000				0	0	59		6483444

Annex VI

Map of the Democratic Republic of the Congo


DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
National capital
District capital
City, town
Major airport
International boundary
District boundary
Main road
Secondary road
Railroad
0 100 200 300 km
0 100 200 mi
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
SUDAN
UGANDA
Lake Victoria
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
Lake Malawi
MALAWI
ZAMBIA
ANGOLA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
PROVINCE ORIENTALE
NORD KIVU
SUD KIVU
MANIEMA
KATANGA
EQUATEUR
KASAI ORIENTAL
KASAI OCCIDENTAL
BANDUNDU
CONGO CENTRAL
Lake Tanganyika
Lake Mai-Ndombe
Kisangani
Bunia
Goma
Bukavu
Uvira
Kindu
Kalemie
Lubumbashi
Likasi
Kolwezi
Mbuji-Mayi
Kananga
Tshikapa
Bandundu
Kikwit
Matadi
Boma
Mbandaka
Gemena
Buta
Bondo
Basoko
Lodja
Kabinda
Bukama
Kamina
Kasaji
Dilolo
Kipushi
Ndola
Mpika
Nakonde
Kasama
Mbeya
Kigoma
Ujiji
Kabambare
Pweto
Moba
Manono
Kongolo
Malemba-Nkulu
Sakania
Kasumbalesa
Luvua
Lualaba
Congo
Ubangi
Uele
Lomami
Tshuapa
Lomela
Lulonga
Kasai
Kwilu
Kwango
Luvua
Lukuga
Ruzizi
Rutshuru
Lubutu
Punia
Ubundu
Yangambi
Ekafi
Bumba
Lisala
Gbadolite
Buburu
Zongo
Libenge
Imese
Inongo
Kutu
Bolobo
Kenge
Kiwit
Idiofa
Gungu
Kahemba
Dibaya
Kole
Lusambo
Mweka
Luebo
Tshikapa
Kananga
Mwene-Ditu
Kapanga
Lubudi
Kamina
Kabalo
Nyunzu
Kalemie
Moba
Kabimba
Pweto
Mitwaba
Malemba-Nkulu
Sakania
Kasumbalesa
Likasi
Kolwezi
Lubumbashi

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Security Council

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Letter dated 12 July 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit the eighth report of the International Independent Investigation Commission, which was prepared pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1595 (2005), 1636 (2005), 1644 (2005), 1686 (2006) and 1748 (2007).

The report describes progress made by the Commission since its previous report dated 15 March 2007 (S/2007/150) in investigating the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 22 other victims, and in providing technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of a number of other attacks perpetrated in Lebanon since 1 October 2004.

The present report provides information on the Commission's priority work in the investigation of the Hariri case, and into 17 other cases, including the assassination of former Member of Parliament Walid Eido in June 2007. The Commission also undertook a comprehensive review of its past and current investigations, which has yielded positive results, including the refinement of the workplan to maximize the utilization of its limited resources. Furthermore, the report highlights, pursuant to Security Council resolution 1757 (2007), steps taken by the Commission to ensure a coordinated transition of its activities to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

I wish to express my thanks to Commissioner Brammertz for his tireless leadership, and to the staff of the Commission for their dedication and commitment, particularly in the light of the deterioration in the political and security environment in Lebanon.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council. Meanwhile, I am transmitting the report to the Government of Lebanon.

(*Signed*) **Ban** Ki-moon

07-42318 (E) 170707

Eighth report of the International Independent Investigation Commission established pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1595 (2005), 1636 (2005), 1644 (2005), 1686 (2006) and 1748 (2007)

Serge Brammertz
Commissioner

Beirut
July 2007

Summary

The Security Council requested the International Independent Investigation Commission to report to the Council on progress in its inquiry, including cooperation received from the Syrian authorities.

The present report outlines progress made in the different aspects of the investigations into the assassination of Rafik Hariri and the 17 other cases for which the Commission has been mandated to provide technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities, including the June 2007 assassination of Member of Parliament Walid Eido.

Since its last report to the Council on 15 March 2007 (S/2007/150), in addition to actively pursuing these investigations, the Commission completed a comprehensive review of all its information, analysis and findings on all past and current investigations. This significant undertaking, which involved all the investigative staff of the Commission, has produced several positive results outlined in this report. Among others, this effort has allowed the Commission to refine its workplans for the next reporting period, making the best possible use of its limited resources.

During the reporting period, the Commission continued to receive generally positive responses to its requests for assistance to Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and other States. Cooperation from all States remains crucial to the Commission's work, and the Commission calls upon all States to be forthcoming in their responses to its requests for assistance.

The Commission notes with concern the deterioration in the political and security environment in Lebanon since its last report to the Council. Although the Commission, in close cooperation with the Lebanese authorities, has put in place mitigating measures to protect its staff and premises, the deterioration in the political and security environment is likely to have a negative effect on the Commission's activities in the coming months.

In the light of the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon by the Security Council in resolution 1757 (2007), the Commission has taken several steps to facilitate the handover from the Commission to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon at a time when the latter shall begin functioning.

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1595 (2005), 1636 (2005), 1644 (2005), 1686 (2006) and 1748 (2007), in which the Council requested the International Independent Investigation Commission to report every four months to the Council on the progress of its inquiry, and on international cooperation, including the cooperation received from the Syrian authorities.

2. This report, the eighth report issued by the Commission, provides an update on issues covered in previous reports to the Council and notes progress in the work of the Commission since its last report of 15 March 2007 (S/2007/150).

3. As outlined in earlier reports, the Commission remains particularly mindful of its obligation to protect the confidentiality of its investigations both in order to ensure the integrity of the legal process and to protect those who have provided information and assistance to the Commission. This approach is taken in full agreement with the Lebanese judicial authorities.

4. Since the last report to the Council, the security situation in Lebanon has deteriorated significantly, as illustrated by the prolonged combat between the Lebanese army and militants in the north of the country, the assassination of Member of Parliament Walid Eido and seven others in central Beirut on 13 June 2007, and the attack on a convoy of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the south of Lebanon on 24 June 2007 in which six peacekeepers were killed. The reporting period also saw several other major bomb attacks throughout the country. This degradation in the security environment comes hand-in-hand with increased political tension in Lebanon and in the region. The Commission, in close cooperation with the Lebanese security forces and with other United Nations bodies, continues to pay close attention to these developments and to try to mitigate the effect these may have on its investigations and on the security of its staff.

5. The Commission continues to maintain close and collegial interaction with the Lebanese authorities on all matters related to its work. Responses from other States, including the Syrian Arab Republic, remain generally satisfactory. The Commission's interaction with all States, including Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, remains an important factor in the Commission's ability to carry out its mandate.

6. The Commission notes the adoption of Security Council resolution 1757 (2007) on 30 May 2007, calling for the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon. The Commission looks forward to cooperating closely with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon during a transition phase in which the Commission's work will be transferred to the Office of the Prosecutor of the Tribunal. The Commission has taken several important steps to ensure a smooth handover at the appropriate time in the near future.

7. In this regard, the reporting period was marked by a significant exercise of consolidation of all of the Commission's information, findings and recommendations of all of the investigations it is conducting. This complex exercise has produced comprehensive confidential consolidated reports totalling more than 2,400 pages, including a 2,000-page report on its investigation into the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and 22 others in Beirut on 14 February 2005,

which the Commission is ready to hand over to the Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon at the appropriate time.

8. During the reporting period, the Commission also made progress in the different areas of the Hariri investigation. Following requests of the Security Council, the Commission also continued to provide technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities in their investigations of 17 other cases, including the assassination of Walid Eido, and to investigate any possible links between these cases and the Hariri case. In total, 84 interviews were conducted during the reporting period by the Commission, covering all current investigations.

II. Consolidation of findings and progress in the investigations

9. Since its last report to the Security Council, one of the main tasks undertaken by the Commission was a comprehensive internal consolidation of information held by the Commission in order to take stock of progress made in all areas of the investigations and to prioritize the next investigative steps. In parallel, the Commission pursued its investigations into the Hariri case and continued to provide assistance to the Lebanese authorities in the 17 other cases, including the assassination of Walid Eido.

A. Consolidation of findings, analysis and recommendations

10. The consolidation of findings, analysis and recommendations was launched in March 2007, and consists of a thorough review of the large amounts of information held by the Commission related to all of its investigations. It was completed in June 2007, and resulted in a number of detailed analytical reports, totalling over 2,400 pages, covering different aspects of the investigation.

11. To achieve the common objective of consolidation, the format and methodology adopted for each investigative project varied according to the topic at hand. Each report presents a critical review of all factual findings held by the Commission, including those emanating from investigations undertaken by the Lebanese authorities. Where appropriate, the reports lay out and evaluate the Commission's past and current investigative hypotheses. The reports also present a detailed assessment of results achieved to date, as well as gaps in the knowledge and understanding of the Commission, and make prioritized recommendations regarding the next steps to be undertaken in each investigation project.

12. This time-consuming undertaking has yielded several positive results. First, it has enabled the Commission to critically and comprehensively assess all the information and analysis it has collected since the start of the investigations, as well as progress made to date. Second, by providing the Commission with an up-to-date bird's eye view of the different strands of the investigations, the exercise has allowed the Commission to effectively prioritize the use of its limited resources in the months to come. The consolidation exercise has also helped identify important aspects and individuals of common interest across several areas of the investigations.

13. Finally, against the backdrop of Security Council resolution 1757 (2007) establishing the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the consolidated reports, which will

be updated to include new findings and analysis, will provide a useful starting point in the transition from the Commission to the Tribunal.

14. In parallel to the consolidation effort, the Commission carried out a thorough inventory of its data holdings during the reporting period. This inventory reveals that, since its creation in 2005, the Commission has accumulated more than 9,200 individual documents amounting to more than 120,000 pages of information related to the investigations. This includes about 1,200 statements, 1,800 investigator notes and over 6,200 other documents, including numerous internal analytical reports and documents received in response to requests for assistance sent to Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and other States.

15. As indicated in previous reports, in order to increase efficiency and facilitate the investigations, the Commission has created and implemented an industry-standard information management system that ensures that the Commission's considerable information holdings are stored in a systematic, secure and user-friendly manner. In addition, the system provides users with powerful search functions and analytical tools. This system has been developed on the basis of best practices used in existing ad hoc international tribunals, and it is foreseen that it will be a particularly useful tool to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. This is a considerable undertaking and one which, given current resources, the Commission expects will have to be carried over beyond the Commission's current mandate.

B. Hariri investigation

16. During the reporting period, the Commission continued to devote most of its resources to the Hariri investigation. The consolidation of the Commission's sizeable holdings and analysis in this case amounts to a broad review of the work conducted to date in the numerous different areas of the investigation, including the large amounts of forensic and communication analysis used to support the investigations. This effort resulted in a 2,000-page consolidated report covering all areas of the Hariri investigation.

17. The Commission also continued to actively pursue investigative steps during the reporting period. Since the Commission's last report to the Council, 32 interviews were conducted by the Commission in relation to the Hariri investigation, including several particularly significant and extensive interviews in Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and other countries.

1. Crime scene and associated topics

18. The Commission has methodically consolidated its considerable information and findings on the forensic aspects of its investigations in the Hariri case. These findings include a series of detailed analytical reports produced by the Commission and the Lebanese authorities, in conjunction with several international experts, on the explosive and other forensic aspects of the crime scene investigation. These analytical reports were compiled on the basis of 58 different forensic examinations undertaken by the Commission and by external experts on the Hariri case, the majority of which has been finalized. In total, more than 10,000 pages of information have been produced on the crime scene aspects of the investigation.

19. The results and analysis of all the different examinations and reports concerning the forensic aspects of the Hariri investigation were summarized and critically assessed in one consolidated report. The report also highlights some remaining questions, which continue to be investigated.

Improvised explosive device

20. Regarding the issue of the improvised explosive device used in the attack, the Commission has consolidated its findings on the type and quantity of explosives used, the type of initiating system used and the container used to carry the improvised explosive device. Since the establishment of the Commission, several hypotheses were tested on these points using the analysis of exhibits found at the crime scene, real explosion experiments as well as results derived from bloodstain research, document analysis, metallographic and paint analyses, fingerprint and DNA research, wound analysis, analysis of the damage sustained by nearby buildings, 14 scaling explosion experiments and numerical simulations conducted at the Commission's behest. The Commission also reviewed results from seismological analyses conducted to test hypotheses on the number of blasts, time of the blast and sound signature of the blast.

21. As concerns the type of explosive used in the attack, the Commission brought together the results obtained from samples taken at the crime scene and chemical analyses. These confirm that the explosive used was composed of a mix of RDX, PETN and TNT. The Commission's consolidation of its analysis of the crater formed by the explosion, compared with the results derived from the explosion experiments and other aspects of the investigations, confirm the Commission's previous conclusions that a single blast was caused by an above-ground charge consisting of approximately 1,800 kg of explosive detonated at 12:55:05. Ongoing efforts to determine the precise origin of the explosives and to ascertain possible forensic links with other cases will be pursued as priorities in the next reporting period.

22. The Commission's holdings on the type of initiating device covered several possible hypotheses by examining the electronic parts recovered from the crime scene and investigating the status of the electronic countermeasures used in the Hariri convoy. These analyses, and the presence of a number of body parts belonging to an unidentified male at the crime scene, confirm the Commission's previous conclusions that the improvised explosive device was most likely triggered by a suicide bomber. The theory of an aerial attack has largely been excluded by the Commission.

23. The Commission has also consolidated all of its information and findings concerning the container of the improvised explosive device. The Commission has reviewed its examinations of the exhibits collected at the crime scene and the results obtained from analyses of characteristics of the fireball caused by the explosion, thermal effects of the blast on surrounding objects, analysis of the characteristics of the crater caused by the explosion in conjunction with results obtained from explosion experiments and the trajectory analysis of vehicle fragments. The consolidation of findings has reinforced the Commission's previous conclusion that the improvised explosive device was most likely detonated from within a Mitsubishi Canter van.

Investigations on the Mitsubishi van

24. During the last reporting period, progress was made in the line of inquiry around the Mitsubishi Canter van most likely used to carry the explosives. The origin and recent history of the van have been established to the satisfaction of the Commission. According to investigations led by the Commission and by the Lebanese authorities, the van left a Mitsubishi factory in Japan in February 2002 and was reported stolen in Kanagawa, Japan, in October 2004. The van was then shipped to the United Arab Emirates and transported to a showroom close to Tripoli in northern Lebanon in December 2004, where it was sold. The Commission has recently acquired information regarding the sale of the van to individuals who could be involved in the final preparation of the van for the attack on Rafik Hariri. This line of inquiry is being pursued as a priority.

Identity of the alleged suicide bomber

25. Regarding the identity of the suicide bomber, the Commission has brought together and reviewed the results from a large number of ongoing and completed orthodontic, isotope and allele frequency analyses and investigative examinations. Based on preliminary results, the Commission's findings remain that the suicide bomber was a male, probably between 20 and 25 years old; that he had short dark hair; that he originally came from a region more arid than Lebanon; and that he did not spend his youth in Lebanon but lived there in the two to three months before his death, which corresponds to findings in other areas of the Commission's investigations. The Commission's experts also reached the preliminary conclusion that this individual lived in an urban environment for the first 10 years of his life and in a rural environment during the last 10 years of his life.

26. Experiments are ongoing to determine the geographic origin of the unidentified male thought to be the suicide bomber. As reported in the Commission's last report, the Commission collected a total of 112 soil and water samples from 28 locations in the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon for comparison purposes. Numerous additional samples were also collected from 26 locations in other countries during the reporting period. On the basis of preliminary results, the Commission has been able to identify a limited number of countries which could be the country of origin of the suicide bomber.

27. The Commission is able to confirm previous conclusions that Ahmed Abu Adass, the individual who appeared in the video claim of responsibility, is not the suicide bomber.

Other forensic issues

28. As part of the consolidation effort, the Commission is in the process of creating a DNA and fingerprint database to be able to store and make use of the 256 nuclear DNA profiles and 66 mitochondrial DNA profiles, 159 fingerprints and two palm prints recovered from the crime scene and on seized items of particular relevance to the investigations. These are currently being compared with existing databases held by several national and international law enforcement agencies.

29. During the reporting period, the Commission initiated an inventory of all the physical and biological exhibits that it has accumulated in the course of its investigations. This process started with the creation of a specific database, standard

operating procedures and the establishment of a dedicated laboratory. About 2,200 exhibits, representing about half of the forensic exhibits currently held by the Commission, have so far been entered into this database. At current capacity, the time-consuming process of entering these exhibits into the database should be completed by the end of the next reporting period.

30. In addition, the Commission has brought together the results of all of its biological examinations, including the detailed results derived from the identification of all the victims in the attack of 14 February 2005. In total, more than 300 biological examinations were conducted in the Hariri investigation, and the results of each of these, including DNA profiles and orthodontic and photographic records, were brought together into one consolidated report.

31. The Commission has also designed a database to store and easily search the sketches of individuals described by eyewitnesses in the course of the investigations. A total of 24 sketches have so far been finalized by sketch artists and entered into this database, which represents a particularly useful tool for interviews and to compare physical descriptions of individuals across different areas of the investigation and across cases.

32. Three digital visualization projects have been completed by external experts to assist investigators to get a clear picture of the city and the crime scene, of the route taken by the convoy and of the movements of Rafik Hariri during his last day, including the alleged communications traffic activity of the bomb team as the convoy proceeded along its route. A fourth project, which will allow users to "walk through" the crime scene, is also ongoing. These visual aids could be of particular use to present certain facts in a possible future court setting.

Other crime scene investigations

33. Through the consolidation of findings related to the crime scene, a number of other issues were resolved to the satisfaction of the Commission. These include, among others, the circumstances behind the choice of the convoy's route from Parliament to the Hariri residence, the status of the electronic jamming devices used by Rafik Hariri's security, the list of persons who knew about the convoy's movement and the composition of Rafik Hariri's convoy on the day of the assassination.

34. In addition, the Commission has reached a satisfactory understanding of the context surrounding specific vehicles present at or near the crime scene. The presence of suspicious road works in the vicinity of the crime scene prior to the attack and allegations of interference with the crime scene after the attack have also been clarified to the satisfaction of the Commission.

35. A number of other areas related to the crime scene remain under active investigation, including a review and finalization of the identification and interview of all the people present at the crime scene at the time of the crime and immediately afterwards.

36. It is worthy of note that the crime scene was released and the road where the attack took place was reopened to vehicle traffic during the reporting period.

2. Individuals involved in the commission of the crime

Ahmed Abu Adass

37. The Commission has completed an extensive review of information and findings related to Ahmed Abu Adass, the individual who appeared in the video claim of responsibility for the attack on Rafik Hariri. This information was drawn from over 70 interviews and a detailed review of all relevant documents. A number of items, including all items seized from the Abu Adass family home, have also been reviewed by the Commission in order to assess their relevance to the investigation. Information retrieved from items seized from other associated individuals and groups has also been reviewed and incorporated into this consolidation exercise, including 10 computers and hard drives, memory sticks and numerous CDs, floppy discs, mobile phones and subscriber identity module (SIM) cards.

38. This consolidation has allowed the Commission to reach a more comprehensive understanding of the background and profile of Ahmed Abu Adass, including his personality, family and associates, employment history, and political and religious views. It has also helped to provide a thorough overview of the Commission's current understanding of his disappearance from his home and the activities of his relatives and friends in the months leading up to and after his disappearance. All of the Commission's information related to the making, acquisition and handling of the videotape has also been reviewed.

39. As indicated earlier, the Commission is able to conclude that Ahmed Abu Adass is not the suicide bomber who carried out the attack on Rafik Hariri. The Commission continues to investigate two possible hypotheses: (a) that Ahmed Abu Adass was forced or duped into recording the video claim of responsibility for the assassination of Rafik Hariri, and then presumably killed; and (b) that Ahmed Abu Adass willingly recorded the video together with individuals belonging to a wider extremist group who may have come together to undertake the filming of the claim of responsibility, acquire the Mitsubishi van and have it prepared with explosives. They may also have participated in the identification of a suicide bomber and may have assisted in delivering him and the bomb to the scene of the crime. In this regard, the Commission has established that some associates of Ahmad Abu Adass had links to networks involved in extremist activities in Lebanon and elsewhere in recent years.

40. In addition, the consolidation effort has helped to identify gaps in the Commission's information and to verify some of its working hypotheses regarding Ahmed Abu Adass. These mainly relate to what happened to him in the period between his disappearance from his home on 16 January 2005 and the assassination of Rafik Hariri and beyond. The Commission is also refining its understanding of the motivation behind the creation of the videotape, the persons involved in its production and delivery and Abu Adass's relationship and links to certain other particular individuals and groups. Key priorities and next steps have been identified to help clarify these matters and to obtain a clearer understanding of the identity and role played by certain persons of interest who may have had a motive, opportunity and capability to carry out the attack.

Communications analysis

41. The Commission has consolidated its sizeable holdings of call records, communications data and analyses related to specific time periods, institutions and individuals of relevance to the Hariri investigation. Since its inception, the Commission has acquired more than 5 billion records of telephone calls and text messages sent through cellular phones in Lebanon, as well as communications data from a number of other countries. The Commission has also acquired a very large number of detailed subscriber call records. Since 2005, the Commission has issued more than 300 requests for assistance to support its communications analysis related to the Hariri investigation.

42. The Commission's communications analysis provides valuable input to the investigations in establishing links between individuals, analysing the behaviour and activity of a number of persons of interest to the investigations and analysing call patterns for specific numbers, times and locations. It is also a very valuable resource in preparing for witness interviews. Given the proven investigative value and potential of communications analysis, the Commission has recently sought outside expertise to help exploit its communications data holdings and analysis. The Commission has also recently acquired new hardware and software, which will allow it to conduct more comprehensive data searches.

43. On the basis of the consolidation exercise, the Commission has confirmed and advanced its earlier conclusions that individuals using six mobile cellular telephone SIM cards acted in a coordinated manner to conduct surveillance on Rafik Hariri in the weeks prior to his assassination. A detailed analysis of the use of these cards on the day of the assassination indicates that these individuals played a critical role in the planning and execution of the attack itself, as demonstrated by their movements and call patterns. The Commission has established the origins of the SIM cards and is finalizing its understanding of the circumstances around the sale of the cards and a number of handsets to the individuals who made use of them in the surveillance of Rafik Hariri. A number of interviews were held during the reporting period to advance this line of inquiry.

44. The Commission also conducted extensive analysis of communications traffic records associated with Ahmed Abu Adass, including analysis of the telephone communication at his home and place of work and on lines belonging to his alleged associates. This revealed interesting information regarding the circumstances around his disappearance from his home and confirms the Commission's conclusions that some of the people with whom he associated had links to networks involved in extremist activities in Lebanon and elsewhere in recent years. In total, 18 communications analysis reports were produced on the topic of Ahmed Abu Adass.

45. Steps have also been taken to learn more about the individuals who placed the calls to the media about the Ahmed Abu Adass video claim of responsibility. The Commission continues to try to identity the callers and to ascertain if any links exist between the callers and individuals or groups of interest to the investigations.

46. The Commission has also been focusing on establishing horizontal and vertical links between individuals linked to the crime scene and those who may have been involved in the preparation of the attack or may have had prior knowledge of the

attack through the analysis of telephone communications. Several telephone numbers have been identified and scrutinized as a result of this line of inquiry.

3. Motives and persons of interest

47. A significant share of the Commission's resources has been devoted to the analysis of the factors that are likely to have shaped the motive to assassinate Rafik Hariri. The consolidation of the Commission's understanding under this heading amounts to a substantial analysis of Rafik Hariri's political and other activities. This also includes a systematic review of the political and security environment in and around Lebanon in the years prior to the attack as it may relate to the motive to carry out the crime.

48. The Commission has reached a satisfactory understanding of the events surrounding the Bank Al-Madina scandal as they relate to the investigations. The Commission is able to conclude that the Al-Madina affair was not a principal motive for the assassination. However, the Commission's holdings on the Al-Madina case have allowed it to reach a much clearer understanding of the financial relationships existing between several individuals through Bank Al-Madina in the period under scrutiny.

49. As indicated in its previous report to the Council, the Commission has significantly narrowed down its investigation into possible motives to those linked to Rafik Hariri's political activities and to the political and personal relationships between Rafik Hariri and political leaders and officials in Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and other countries during that period. The Commission has consolidated its information and findings in a number of areas related to the political environment in Lebanon, with a focus on the 2004-2005 period. It is worthy of note that, although mainly used in the Hariri case, this has also been useful in the investigations of the other attacks targeted at specific individuals.

50. The Commission has consolidated its understanding of the context around the adoption of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004). The Commission has also consolidated its findings on certain relevant aspects of the possible roles played by Rafik Hariri and other prominent Lebanese and international political leaders in the adoption of the resolution and of the perception of those roles by some external parties. While some events surrounding the adoption of resolution 1559 (2004) need to be further investigated, the Commission's working hypothesis is that it is likely that these events played an important role in shaping the environment in which the motives to assassinate Rafik Hariri emerged.

51. The Commission has also focused on the sequence of events that led to the vote to modify the Lebanese Constitution to extend the mandate of President Emile Lahoud and its relevance to the investigation. The Commission has reached a satisfactory understanding of the overall role and position of various political actors during that period and of the impact they could have had on the motive to carry out the attack.

52. The Commission has further focused on reviewing its holdings regarding the new electoral law being discussed during the period under examination and its impact on the different political formations contending the 2005 parliamentary elections, including that of Rafik Hariri. The Commission has also focused on the

perception of possible outcomes held by different parties in Lebanon and elsewhere, the basis for such perceptions and their relevance to the investigation.

53. Although it has focused on this group of inquiries into the motives behind the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the Commission also continues to explore alternative hypotheses. These include the possibility that Hariri was targeted, for example, by extremist groups because he was widely considered in Lebanon and the Arab world as a leading figure in his community. It cannot be excluded that the motives to assassinate Hariri could have arisen from a combination of political and sectarian factors. A number of aspects related to this hypothesis are still being investigated.

54. The Commission has brought together and summarized its findings regarding the organization of certain security and intelligence institutions of relevance to the investigation and present in Lebanon in the period prior to the assassination of Rafik Hariri, particularly during 2004 and early 2005. To advance this line of inquiry, the Commission has increased its understanding of the de facto and de jure structures of various organizations of interest to the investigation.

55. Following a detailed review of all its information and findings, the Commission has broadened its understanding of the environment in which the motives to assassinate Rafik Hariri emerged. On the basis of this understanding, and supported by a number of findings in other areas of its investigations, the Commission has identified a number of persons of particular interest who may have been involved in some aspects of the preparation and commission of the crime or could have had prior knowledge that such a plan was under way. The Commission has consolidated its information and findings and recommended next steps concerning the possible involvement of these individuals in the assassination of Rafik Hariri. This line of inquiry will be pursued as a priority in the next reporting period.

4. Other investigative issues

56. The Commission continues to evaluate reports about several specific threats, warnings and assurances conveyed to Rafik Hariri through different intermediaries in the last months of his life. The Commission's preliminary conclusion remains that tension had escalated in the months prior to the assassination to such an extent that certain issues concerning Rafik Hariri's personal safety had been discussed at a high level both in Lebanon and in other countries. The Commission is also continuing to look into reports that certain individuals were attempting to broker a rapprochement to diffuse these tensions by developing alternative channels of communication. This remains an open line of investigation, which the Commission will pursue in the next reporting period.

57. The Commission has reached a satisfactory understanding of the activities of Rafik Hariri in the days leading up to the attack. In addition, the Commission has established a comprehensive list of the important meetings conducted by Rafik Hariri over a period of several months prior to his assassination. In addition, the Commission has looked into events related to his resignation as Prime Minister in October 2004. The Commission is continuing to complete and confirm details concerning some of these important meetings and events.

5. Witness protection

58. The requirement to ensure the security of witnesses in a manner that will preserve the integrity of evidence remains a priority for the Commission, particularly in view of the transition to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Although the Commission is confident that it can provide a timely and appropriate operational response to such a situation if the need arises, the Commission is also aware that a review, formalization and extension of these arrangements will need to be conducted in the near future.

C. Technical assistance in other cases

59. The Commission has consolidated its information, findings and recommendations on each of the other cases and has reviewed the Lebanese authorities' case files. In total, over 400 pages of consolidated reports were produced on these other cases, and the final and preliminary findings from 25 forensic examinations undertaken by the Commission and by external experts on these cases have been reviewed. The consolidation of findings in the 17 cases was carried out with a particular focus on identifying possible links between the cases and with the Hariri case, in line with both the mandate of the Commission and with the Agreement on the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, referred to in Security Council resolution 1757 (2007).

60. During the reporting period, as mandated by the Security Council, the Commission continued to provide technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities in their investigations of these 17 other cases, including the assassination of Member of Parliament Walid Eido and seven others on 13 June 2007 in central Beirut. In total, 25 interviews were conducted on the nine bomb attacks and 27 interviews were conducted on the targeted attacks during the reporting period.

1. Nine bomb attacks

61. The Commission has consolidated information received from the Lebanese authorities and its own investigative work on the nine bomb attacks in which no specific individuals appear to have been targeted, including the 13 February 2007 Ain Alaq bombing. Based on this consolidation, the Commission has identified next steps to be taken in these investigations.

62. Regarding the Ain Alaq bombings, the Commission, working in conjunction with the Lebanese authorities, has established that in each case of the two buses that were targeted, a male boarded the bus, placed an improvised explosive device under one of the seats and then got off the bus before the explosion took place.

63. Some progress was made in the reporting period, through interviews conducted by the Commission and the Lebanese authorities, to establish the identities of the perpetrators. The Lebanese authorities have arrested a number of individuals in connection with the Ain Alaq bombings. One of these individuals has confessed to having placed a bomb in one of the buses. According to statements taken from these individuals, the perpetrators may be linked to extremist groups currently active in Lebanon.

64. A preliminary forensic report indicates that there was only one explosion in each bus, and that in each case the improvised explosive device was placed on the

left hand side of the bus, between the fourth and seventh rows. The report also confirms that the improvised explosive device in the Mitsubishi bus contained about 1.5 kg of explosives combined with between 0.5 and 1 kg of steel ball bearings and that the explosive substances used in the two buses were of a high velocity similar to TNT. These findings are compatible with information given by a number of witnesses and suspects in their statements.

65. Over 120 exhibits, as well as DNA samples, have been collected from the Ain Alaq crime scene, and forensic analysis on these exhibits and samples is ongoing. The Commission has also collected potentially relevant closed-circuit television footage, which will be reviewed in the next reporting period.

66. At this stage, no forensic links between the Ain Alaq bombings and any of the other cases under investigation have been firmly established. Evidence and statements collected by the Commission and the Lebanese authorities indicate that the choice of the date, on the eve of the second anniversary of the assassination of Rafik Hariri, may however be connected with the motives for the attack. The Commission is continuing to investigate this information and other leads relevant to potential links between the Ain Alaq case and other cases within the mandate of the Commission.

67. The Commission has conducted a similar review of information and findings received from the Lebanese authorities in relation to the other eight non-targeted bomb attacks, on which it has been asked to provide assistance to the Lebanese authorities. The objective of this review is twofold: to make a constructive assessment of the investigation conducted by the Lebanese authorities into each case and to identify possible linkages with other cases or areas of interest to the Commission, particularly related to the Hariri case. In total, the Commission has produced three detailed analytical reports comparing these attacks. It should be noted, however, that, owing to resource limitations within the Commission and to other investigative priorities, progress in the investigation of these cases has been limited.

2. Eight targeted attacks

68. The Commission has brought together all of its information, findings and recommendations regarding the attacks targeted at Marwan Hamedeh, Samir Kassir, George Hawi, Elias El-Murr, May Chidiac, Gebran Tueni, Pierre Gemayel and Walid Eido. The Commission has also continued to pursue its investigations into these cases during the reporting period.

Victim profiles and possible motives

69. As part of the consolidation, the Commission has refined its profile of each of the principal victims and has continued to develop a detailed case narrative for each case.

70. Given the profile of the victims, the Commission has given particular attention to the public and political activities of each of the victims in the period preceding the attacks because the Commission's working hypothesis is that it is likely that these played an important role in shaping the environment in which motives to carry out the attacks emerged. This was conducted in tandem with similar steps taken in the Hariri investigation, as detailed above.

71. The Commission has also consolidated its holdings and understanding of the public stance taken by the victims regarding several of the major events that shaped the Lebanese political landscape in recent years, including, among others, the adoption of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004), the extension of the term of President Emile Lahoud, the assassination of Rafik Hariri and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. This analysis has revealed both interesting commonalities as well as some potentially relevant differences in the positions taken by the individuals targeted.

72. In addition, the Commission has consolidated its information and analyses regarding the relationships between each of the victims and several individuals and institutions of particular interest to the investigations. In this line of investigation, the Commission's working hypothesis is that some of these relationships are connected with areas of particular interest in the Hariri investigation.

Modus operandi

73. All of the attacks, except for the assassination of Pierre Gemayel, involved an improvised explosive device placed either in the victim's own vehicle or in a vehicle parked along the route that the victim took on the day of the attack.

74. The modus operandi in each of the attacks involving an improvised explosive device is only different to the extent that a different level of sophistication was necessary to maximize the chance of success. In the attacks targeting May Chidiac, Samir Kassir and George Hawi, an explosive device was placed under each victim's vehicle while it was parked unguarded.

75. In the Marwan Hamadeh, Elias El-Murr and Gebran Tueni cases, where the targeted person had some security arrangement in place, a different modus operandi, involving a roadside vehicle containing a remotely triggered improvised explosive device, was chosen in order to overcome those security arrangements.

76. The Commission's consolidation and comparison of its findings in each of the cases suggest further similarities related to the explosives and to the vehicles used in several of the attacks. The Commission is also using its DNA, fingerprints and sketch databases in the context of these investigations. The Commission will pursue this line of investigation in the coming months.

Threats and claims of responsibility

77. The Commission has also collected a significant amount of information about threats that some of the victims received and has identified common individuals who allegedly threatened several of the victims in the cases under investigation. These individuals may also be linked to the Hariri investigation.

78. In addition, and as noted in previous reports, the Commission's findings suggest that there may be a link between the group claiming responsibility for the Hariri killing and the group that claimed responsibility for the attacks on Samir Kassir, Gebran Tueni and Pierre Gemayel. The Commission has conducted several interviews that relate to this line of inquiry and continues to explore issues relating to these groups.

Communications analysis

79. The analysis of relevant communications traffic has significantly advanced the investigation of the targeted attacks. The nature of the targeted attacks and the profile of the victims suggest that the perpetrators conducted surveillance in the days and weeks preceding the attacks. In addition, it is likely that telephone contact was maintained within each team of perpetrators in the period immediately prior and immediately subsequent to each attack.

80. The Commission has conducted detailed communications analysis to assess whether traces of this surveillance can be identified using call records of persons of interest and call patterns in specific geographical areas over specific time periods. Overall, the Commission notes progress in this analysis, which has helped to uncover interesting leads.

81. Communications analysis conducted so far has helped confirm the Commission's hypothesis that a number of individuals may be relevant to the Hariri case and one or more of the other cases. The Commission will be conducting a number of interviews to further assess the linkages identified so far.

Pierre Gemayel case

82. The Commission has supported the Lebanese authorities by conducting eight interviews relating to the Gemayel case since March 2007, bringing the total number of interviews conducted by the Commission as part of the Gemayel investigation to 19. The Commission is looking into a number of potential motives for the crime, and it is also continuing to investigate whether Pierre Gemayel was under surveillance during the days preceding his attack and who may have known about his intended movements at the time he was killed. Based on witness statements collected so far, the Commission's findings suggest that Mr. Gemayel may have been selected among a small group of potential targets because he had minimal security arrangements in place.

Walid Eido case

83. On 13 June 2007, at around 17.45, Walid Eido, his son, two bodyguards and four other individuals were killed when an improvised explosive device exploded near Mr. Eido's vehicle. Mr. Eido was a member of the parliamentary majority bloc and was considered to be close to Rafik Hariri. The attack took place in the area known as the Manara Corniche in central Beirut, which generally sees heavy vehicle traffic at the time the attack took place.

84. On 14 June 2007, following a request from the Lebanese Prime Minister to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Commission was mandated to provide technical assistance to the Lebanese authorities in their investigation into this attack.

85. A team from the Commission visited the crime scene on 15 June 2007, accompanied by six international forensic experts. Subsequently, the Commission and the Lebanese authorities conducted a detailed two-week-long forensic examination of the crime scene.

86. The investigation into this attack is still at an early stage, and the Commission awaits the results from the forensic experts. However, the Commission, working in close cooperation with the Lebanese authorities, has been able to determine a few

elements of interest. Primary conclusions provide some information on the type of vehicle used to carry the improvised explosive device. Further analysis is under way to confirm this finding and to determine the type and quantity of explosives used in the attack.

87. The Commission has also started to establish possible motives for the attack, and has started to put together a profile of the targeted victim and to build a case narrative. The Commission will also continue to identify possible links with other attacks and with the Hariri case. This investigation will be pursued in the next reporting period.

III. External cooperation

A. Interaction with the Lebanese authorities

88. Since its last report to the Council, the Commission has continued to interact closely with the Lebanese authorities on all cases under investigation. Regular meetings and briefings have continued to take place between the Commission and the Prosecutor General and his staff, as well as with the investigative judges assigned to the different cases.

89. During the reporting period, the Commission renewed its efforts to ensure that the Lebanese authorities are regularly kept abreast of the Commission's activities and progress made in its investigations. The Commission continued to share significant amounts of information with the relevant Lebanese authorities, including interviews and analytical reports.

90. Since the last report to the Council, the Commission addressed 88 requests for assistance to the Prosecutor General seeking, inter alia, to obtain relevant documents and help in arranging interviews and other missions in Lebanon. This brings the total number of requests for assistance addressed to the Lebanese authorities since January 2006 to 218. The Lebanese authorities have continued to respond fully and expeditiously to these requests. The Commission gratefully acknowledges this positive cooperation.

91. The Commission also continues to enjoy a close and collegial working relationship with the Internal Security Forces and the Lebanese Army, which provide security to the Commission staff and facilities. The Commission is grateful to these institutions for their excellent support.

B. Cooperation with the Syrian Arab Republic

92. In line with the obligations of the Syrian Arab Republic under Security Council resolutions 1636 (2005) and 1644 (2005), and the common understanding reached between the Commission and the Syrian Arab Republic in 2006, the cooperation of the Syrian Arab Republic with the Commission remains generally satisfactory.

93. Since its last report to the Council, the Commission has submitted 11 formal requests for assistance to the Syrian Arab Republic, asking it to facilitate a number of interviews and seeking to obtain information about individuals and events of

interest to the Commission. This brings the total number of requests for assistance addressed to the Syrian authorities since January 2006 to 57. The Syrian authorities were also forthcoming in making arrangements for four missions to Syria during the reporting period.

94. During the reporting period, the Syrian Arab Republic continued to provide the Commission with assistance in response to its requests within the appropriate timescales. The Commission is also grateful for the logistical and security arrangements provided by Syrian authorities for the Commission's various activities in the Syrian Arab Republic.

95. The Commission will continue to request the full cooperation of the Syrian Arab Republic, which remains crucial to the successful completion of the mandate of the Commission.

C. Cooperation with other States

96. During the reporting period, a total of 18 requests for assistance were sent to 12 States, in addition to the requests for assistance sent to Lebanese and Syrian authorities. This brings the total number of requests for assistance addressed to other States since January 2006 to 106.

97. The Commission has greatly benefited from the responses of States to its requests where full and prompt cooperation has been forthcoming. The Commission is very grateful for this cooperation.

98. It remains of paramount importance that the Commission should be able to rely on the support of States to provide information, assistance, expertise and access when required. During the reporting period, the Commission received particularly helpful and timely assistance from a number of States.

99. The Commission also gratefully acknowledges the expertise and other forms of assistance it received from several States and international institutions during the reporting period. The Commission reiterates the need for continued assistance from these entities in making qualified and specialized human resources available on a regular basis to ensure progress in the investigations.

100. As the Commission noted in its last report to the Council, the Commission will be able to effectively carry out its mandate only if it can count on the cooperation of all States to provide the Commission with the information requested, access to certain individuals, including current and past Government officials, and other forms of technical assistance.

IV. Security

101. The security situation in Lebanon has markedly deteriorated since the Commission's last report. Lebanese armed forces have been engaged in sustained combat for several weeks with fighters associated with Fatah al-Islam in the refugee camp of Nahr al-Barid, near the city of Tripoli in the northern part of the country.

102. Violence during the reporting period was not confined to these areas. Several other significant incidents took place, including the assassination of Walid Eido and

seven others on 13 June 2007. In addition to that attack, a significant number of incidents involving improvised explosive devices took place in Lebanon during the reporting period causing several casualties.

103. On 24 June 2007, six peacekeepers serving with UNIFIL were killed when their convoy was struck by an improvised explosive device near the southern town of Khiam.

104. Security analysis conducted by the Commission in conjunction with several other organizations indicates that the security outlook for Lebanon over the coming months appears to be bleak. This is owed in large part to the combined negative effects of the ongoing political stalemate between the majority and the opposition in Lebanon and the deterioration in the security situation in the region. The period in the run-up to the Lebanese presidential elections, scheduled for later this year, is widely expected to be one of growing tension, possibly marked by further security incidents. In addition, it is unclear what impact the creation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon will have on the security situation in Lebanon and on the Commission in particular in the months to come.

105. The Commission is very mindful of this general threat environment and of specific threats it faces because of the nature of its mandate. During the reporting period, the Commission conducted regular assessments on all aspects of its security in close cooperation with the Lebanese security forces. Based on these assessments, the Commission, with the full support of the Lebanese authorities, has implemented additional mitigating measures.

106. While measures have been taken to reduce the risks facing the Commission and its staff, the degradation in the security environment in Lebanon has had several negative effects on the ability of the Commission to carry out its mandate. First, this may affect progress in the investigations in that it restricts the Commission's ability to conduct interviews and other investigative activities as freely as was previously the case. Second, the current insecurity and political instability may cause some witnesses to hesitate to cooperate with the Commission. Finally, security concerns may impact the Commission's ability to attract and retain qualified staff in the months to come.

V. Organizational support

A. Recruitment

107. During the past four months, the efforts of the Commission to improve its staffing have borne some positive results, particularly in the investigation, security and language sections, but recruitment remains an area of concern. Of the approved 188 international posts, 125 are filled, compared with 104 at the end of the last reporting period. Of the 51 approved national posts in the Commission, 44 have been filled. The investigation division currently consists of 50 international staff, including 30 investigators, analysts and technical experts.

108. In its last report to the Council, the Commission noted with concern the problem of recruitment of qualified language staff, which remains an essential component of the Commission's ability to carry out its mandate effectively. During the period under review, the Commission made progress in this area. A total of 17

language staff posts have been filled in the language section, up from three at the end of the last reporting period. The Commission also relies on a number of qualified freelance interpreters to fill the human resource gaps in this area. The Department for General Assembly and Conference Management of the Secretariat has been forthcoming in providing one staff interpreter and one staff translator for a period of three months. The Commission is grateful for this support.

B. Budget

109. In June 2007, the Commission submitted a budget proposal for 2008. Since it will be a maintenance budget, no major changes in staffing are envisaged except for a modest increase in security staff resulting from the need to maintain separate premises for office space and accommodation of staff.

VI. Conclusions

110. The substantial consolidation of the Commission's information, analysis and recommendations, which was started and completed during the reporting period, amounts to a significant step in the investigation into the assassination of Rafik Hariri. The 2,400 pages of reports produced as a result of the consolidation effort on the Hariri and the other cases offer both a comprehensive overview of the considerable progress made to date and a valuable tool to further identify and explore remaining investigative steps to be taken in order to complete the Commission's understanding of the facts surrounding these attacks.

111. This undertaking has been a significant step forward in several ways. The consolidation has helped highlight the large number of questions that have been resolved to the satisfaction of the Commission in each area of the investigations. The consolidation effort has equally allowed the Commission to identify a number of key questions that remain open and where further investigative steps will need to be taken. By providing an overview of the status of all the areas of the investigations, the consolidation effort has also allowed the Commission to identity a number of important commonalities between the cases under investigation. These commonalities will be explored in greater depth in the next reporting period. Finally, the consolidated reports emerging from this effort represent a valuable starting point in the transition from the Commission to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

112. The Commission notes that the consolidation effort undertaken has helped identify a number of persons of particular interest who may have been involved in some aspect of the preparation and execution of the attack on Rafik Hariri or the other cases under investigation or could have had prior knowledge that plans to carry out these attacks were under way. The Commission will pursue this line of inquiry as a priority in the coming months.

113. Based on the results of the consolidation effort, the Commission produced detailed workplans to identify the priority objectives in each area of the investigation. These workplans, which amount to 150 pages, include, among others, forensic examinations, documents to be reviewed, interviews to be conducted and plans for the collection of further evidence. The workplans are also very helpful to

make the best use of the Commission's limited resources. The Commission foresees that the next reporting period will be particularly active in carrying out the priorities identified as a result of the consolidation effort. More than 200 interviews are planned in the Hariri investigation and about 100 interviews are being scheduled in the 17 other cases.

114. In all aspects of its work, the Commission continues to enjoy close and collegial cooperation with the Lebanese authorities, particularly with the Prosecutor General and his staff. Illustrating the sustained pace of the investigations, the number of requests for assistance addressed to the Lebanese authorities has considerably increased since the Commission's last report to the Council. Nevertheless, the Lebanese authorities have continued to respond fully to these requests.

115. The Commission also notes that the Syrian Arab Republic and other States have continued to provide mostly positive responses to its requests for assistance. Cooperation from all States remains of paramount importance in order for the Commission to implement its mandate in a timely manner. The Commission therefore calls on all States to continue to respond fully to the Commission's requests.

116. Since the Commission's last report to the Council, Lebanon has experienced a phase of increased political and security volatility, as illustrated by the prolonged fighting in the refugee camp of Nahr al-Barid, the assassination of Walid Eido and the attack on UNIFIL troops. As indicated above, the Commission is taking all possible measures to mitigate the risks to its staff and premises. The Commission is particularly grateful to the Lebanese security forces for their outstanding support in this respect.

117. Against the backdrop of Security Council resolution 1757 (2007), the Commission is working to ensure a smooth handover between the Commission and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon when the Tribunal begins to function. The Commission stands ready to cooperate with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon on all issues pertaining to this transition.